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INTRODUCTION 
 
  The scope and enforcement of intellectual property (IP) laws are becoming 
salient, for the first time, to a wide cohort of U.S. and international communities.  
National and international legislation, including the Stop Online Piracy Act 
(SOPA),1 the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA),2 and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA),3 have generated protests online and in the streets by people 
who are concerned about the expansion of IP rights.  Common to each of these 
proposals was an expansion in the use of criminal sanctions to deter IP 
violations.4  Many copyright owners and the associations that represent them 
support criminal enforcement of IP, including the use of imprisonment, to combat 
the threat of increased IP piracy on the internet and throughout a globalized 
economy.  Others, including a heterogeneous coalition of scholars, activists, and 
internet based companies like Google and Wikipedia, fear that using criminal 
♣ Assistant Professor of Law, Co-Director of the Center for Empirical Studies of Intellectual 
Property, Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
♦ Deputy Dean and Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.  The authors wish to 
thank Kathy Baker, Stefan Bechtold, Rochelle Dreyfuss, Harry First, Sarah Harding, Lital 
Helman, Mark Lemley, Irina Manta, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Pam Samuelson, David Schwartz, 
and the attendees of the NYU Colloquium on Innovation Policy, the Max Planck-ETH Zurich 
Conference on the Economics of IP and Antitrust, and the Chicago-Kent Faculty Workshop for 
comments on a previous draft of this Article.  The authors are also grateful for excellent research 
assistance by Leah Eubanks, Matthew Schock, and Dayron Silverio. 
1 Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 103(a)(1)(B) (1st Sess. 2011). 
2 Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual Property Act of 
2011 
(PROTECT IP), S. 968, 112th Cong. § 3(a)(1)(B) (1st Sess. 2011). 
3 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, at E-1, Oct. 1, 2011, 50 I.L.M. 239, 243 (2011). 
4 See Christophe Geiger, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement and Criminal Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property: What Consequences for the European Union?, in IP RIGHTS AT THE 
CROSSROADS OF TRADE (J. Rosen ed., 2012); Michael A. Carrier, SOPA, PIPA, ACTA, TPP: An 
Alphabet Soup of Innovation-Stifling Copyright Legislation and Agreement, 11 NW. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 1 (2013). 
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sanctions to protect IP will expand already overgrown rights and chill valuable 
expressive and inventive behavior.5 
 There is likely some truth in both of these positions. The internet and 
global markets do make infringing IP easier and detection of infringement more 
difficult.  Accordingly, the deterrent effect of civil sanctions for IP violation may 
be weakeningweakening.  Enhanced criminal sanctions could, however, tilt the 
balance between owners and users of IP too far towards owners, thereby limiting 
the opportunities for creative and innovative developments in the future.  They 
might also impose unnecessary costs upon the convicted infringers themselves, 
channeling resources toward incarceration rather than research and development.  
In situations where proposed rules present both costs and benefits, economic 
analysis of law can play an important role in policymaking.6   
 This Article offers an economic analysis of the use of criminal liability in 
two areas of IP:  copyright law and patent law.7  Our goal is to analyze the 
relative costs and benefits of criminal sanctions for IP violations.  Economic 
analysis is particularly appropriate to this discussion for a number of reasons.  
Copyright and patent law are widely recognized as resting on utilitarian 
foundations of promoting social welfare by incentivizing investment in 
informational goods.8  They do this by providing exclusive rights to creators of IP 
that allow them to charge prices for use that are above marginal cost.  Yet IP’s 
commitment to incentives to create must be balanced by the costs that those rights 
have for others who want to use or further develop the works and inventions that 
have been created.  Economic analysis’s explicit focus on utilitarian welfare 
calculus, which compares the costs and benefits of legal rules, can aid in striking 
the correct balance.   
5 Mike Masnick, An Updated Analysis: Why SOPA & PIPA Are A Bad Idea, Dangerous & 
Unnecessary, 
TECHDIRT (Jan. 18, 2012, 7:32 AM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120117/23002717445/updatedanalysis- 
why-sopa-pipa-are-bad-idea-dangerous-unnecessary.shtml; Michael A. Carrier, The Proposed 
New Copyright Crime of “Aiding and Abetting,” OUPBLOG (Oct. 28, 2010, 2:30 PM), 
http://blog.oup.com/2010/10/copyrightcrime/. 
6 See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Well-Being Analysis vs. Cost-
Benefit Analysis, DUKE L. J. (forthcoming 2013). 
7 This Article does not discuss trademark law although criminal liability is used to combat 
counterfeit goods.  The principal reason we have excluded trademark law from this discussion is 
that the underlying economic rationale for trademark protection—avoiding consumer confusion—
is different from the underlying economic rationale for copyright and patent law—solving a public 
goods problem for informational goods. 
8 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW (2005). But see ROBERT MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2012) 
(proposing a Lockean foundation for IP protection). 
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 An explicitly economic focus on criminal sanctions in IP—to the 
exclusion of other normative methodologies—is important for an additional 
reason.  Many IP stakeholders and scholars have operated under the assumption 
that there is an economic case for criminal IP sanctions.9  Criminal sanctions for 
IP infringement are thought to be justified by the possibility of deterring or 
incapacitating would-be infringers.  When criminal IP sanctions have been 
criticized, the criticism has usually come from a normative position outside of 
economics—moral rights, for instance.10  The economic case for criminal 
sanctions is usually treated as unassailable. 
In this article, we mean to assail it.  We do not believe that the case for 
criminal sanctions in IP is nearly as strong as many have treated it.  Indeed, we 
will argue that criminal liability may be justified only in one small corner of IP 
law, in response to one discrete type of infringement.  We believe that our 
analysis is particularly important because it undermines the economic case for 
criminal sanctions at its very foundation.  There is no need to engage in 
complicated and frequently unresolvable debates about economic versus moral 
norms if both modes of thought militate equally against criminal IP penalties.  
Even without venturing into the deep waters of normative debate, we believe the 
range of economically justifiable criminal IP sanctions is quite narrow. 
Additionally, as we will explain below, our analysis in this article 
generally accepts the assumptions of traditional law and economics about 
intellectual property law.  That is, we assume for purposes of this paper that IP is 
necessary to solve the public goods problem in information, that it incentivizes 
people to create, and that the government will do an appropriate job of balancing 
the rights of creators with the rights of users.  The assumptions have all been 
subjected to withering critiques by scholars (including the authors of this article).  
We believe, however, that it is important to keep these assumptions intact as an 
initial matter.  If the case for criminal IP sanctions is weak when the assumptions 
are accepted, it will only be weaker once those assumptions have been relaxed. 
According to our analysis, there is a limited and tentative case for the use 
of criminal liability, including imprisonment and alternative sanctions, for only 
some types of copyright infringement—and none at all for patent infringement.  
9 See e.g. I. Trotter Hardy, Criminal Copyright Infringement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305, 
315 (2002) (hereinafter Criminal Copyright). 
10 Miriam Bitton, Rethinking the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement’s Criminal Copyright 
Infringement Measures, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 67 (2012); Irina D. Manta, The Puzzle of 
Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 469 (2011); 
Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some Observations on the Use 
of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 167, 240 
(2002); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Crime of Copyright Infringement: An Inquiry Based on 
Morality, Harm, and Criminal Theory, 83 B.U. L. REV. 731 (2003). 
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Because of the large scale of some copyright violations and the difficulty of 
detecting them, civil remedies with punitive damages will create insufficient 
deterrence.  In response, copyright owners will resort to self-help, using digital 
rights management (DRM) technologies to prevent unauthorized copying.  But 
DRM tends to be overbroad and eliminate much socially valuable copying.  Thus, 
criminal sanctions could provide a way of deterring harmful copying while 
keeping valuable copying free from the restrictions of DRM.  Imprisoning a few 
people whose behavior is inarguably harmful may free up opportunities for others 
who are engaging in welfare-enhancing expression.  As we explain, however, it is 
difficult to predict whether criminal sanctions will have these intended effects.  
The behaviors of various parties are difficult to anticipate and may not coincide 
with the assumptions of economic analysis. 
 The situation in patent law is different.  Patent violations tend to be easier 
to detect than copyright violations.  More importantly, unlike many copyright 
infringers, typical patent infringers will have sufficient resources to be able to 
satisfy judgments against them.  This means that civil remedies should produce 
adequate deterrence and there is little need for liberty deprivations associated with 
criminal sanctions. 
 The Article is organized in three Parts.  In Part I, we introduce the 
standard economic analysis of criminal law.  Part II applies this analysis to 
copyright law.  We first consider whether any case can be made for incorporating 
criminal sanctions into copyright law. After determining that such a case exists, 
we next discuss the appropriate scope of criminal copyright law. Part III applies 
economic analysis to the possibility of criminal patent law.  Our analysis suggests 
that criminal liability is unnecessary to deter patent violations. 
 
I.  THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 In this Part we present an overview of the economic theories of intellectual 
property and criminal punishment.  Although the economic theory of IP may be 
familiar to many readers, we offer a brief synopsis here in the interest of 
completeness.  We then explain why criminal laws, and sanctions such as 
incarceration, are often necessary despite the availability of civil damages.  And 
we explain the economic rationale for the criminalization of property offenses 
despite the lack of any obvious economic loss.  These explanations are offered 
with an eye towards intellectual property crimes, which will be the focus of the 
succeeding Parts. 
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A. The Economics of Intellectual Property 
 
 We offer here a simple snapshot of the economics of intellectual property.  
Much important work has been done on this subject, and we will not attempt to 
summarize all of it.11  For our purposes, a baseline understanding of the economic 
theory surrounding IP law is sufficient.   
 Inventive ideas and creative works are public goods: once they have been 
created, they can be shared (copied) among many individuals to the benefit of all 
of them simultaneously.12  In this respect, they are also nonrival goods: multiple 
people can make use of an idea or a creative work without depriving one another 
of the enjoyment and use of that work.13  Two firms can sell DVD players that 
use the same technology simultaneously, and multiple people can read War and 
Peace simultaneously without interfering with one another.  Because intellectual 
and creative ideas are public goods, they are liable to be under-produced.  The 
first individual to think of an invention or a creative work bears all the costs of 
creating, while others can copy the idea or the work and dissipate the creator’s 
advantage.14  The threat that the creator will bear all of the costs and only reap a 
fraction of the benefits raises the possibility that creators might not think it worth 
their time and resources to create in the first place. 
Intellectual property rights exist in order to solve this public goods 
problem and to encourage the production of innovative and creative goods.15  
Property rights in inventions and creative works allow their creators to capture all 
of the rents from the creation of those goods.  Without having to fear that their 
profits will be dissipated, creators will have greater incentives to innovate in the 
first place.16  However, these property rights simultaneously allow their owners to 
charge monopoly prices.  This leads to deadweight losses as some consumers who 
would consume the goods if they were priced competitively cannot afford the 
11 See, e.g., Edmund Kitsch, Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J. L. & ECON. 265, 267-
71 (1977) (proposing a patent prospect theory); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the 
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990) (offering a New Institutional 
Economics approach to patent law); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8; Mark F. Grady, Patent Law 
and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 305 (1992) (proposing a rent dissipation theory of patent 
law). 
12 Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 129, 129 (2004) (“Ideas are public goods: they can be copied freely and used by anyone who 
is aware of them without depriving others of their use.”). 
13 See Peter Lee, The Accession Insight and Patent Infringement Remedies, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
175, 240 (2011) (detailing the nonrival nature of intellectual property rights). 
14 See Lemley, supra note 12, at 129-33 (laying out the standard justification for intellectual 
property). 
15 Id. at 132 (explaining how IP rights solve the public goods problem in ideas). 
16 Id. at 133 (same). 
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monopoly prices.  Intellectual property is thus thought to trade off dynamic 
efficiency—greater innovation and creativity—against static inefficiency, namely 
deadweight losses.17 
Efficiently solving the public goods problem does not, however, mean that 
creators and innovators should be given maximal rights in their contributions.  In 
addition to creating static inefficiencies, strong IP rights also prevent others from 
making welfare enhancing uses of protected works and inventions.  Others may 
wish to create derivative works of a copyrighted play or new improvements of a 
patented machine.   These contributions are more expensive when the underlying 
contribution is protected by an IP right that must be licensed.  In addition, there is 
a concern that some socially valuable behavior will not be generated at all 
because the IP owner may refuse to license it.  For example, owners of copyrights 
may be unwilling to license parodies and critical reviews of their works.   
For these reasons, the duration and scope of IP rights should be limited.  
IP law’s goal is to balance the incentives provided to creators with the interests of 
the public and of subsequent creators.  The current generation of creators and 
inventors should only be given enough rights in their contributions to ensure that 
they can recapture sufficient profits to make creating them worthwhile.  Giving 
additional rights to these people produces inefficiencies both through deadweight 
losses and by increasing the costs of creating and inventing in subsequent 
generations.   
One final point bears emphasis.  Many scholars believe that intellectual 
property rights do not encourage substantially greater invention or creativity, at 
least in some contexts.18  In addition, many believe that current IP laws are not 
efficiently balanced, because they provide excessive incentives to the current 
generation of creators at the expense of the public and subsequent creators.  (We 
count ourselves among this group to some extent.)  However, adopting that view 
here would render the inquiry we seek to undertake far too easy.  If intellectual 
property rights are not necessary to induce innovation or creativity, then there is 
no economic justification for intellectual property rights and they should simply 
be eliminated.19  Or, in lieu of eliminating IP rights, there should be no remedy—
17 Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights to Innovation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
863, 867 (2007) (explaining that patents “involve[] a fundamental tradeoff between dynamic and 
static efficiency: patents spur innovation but only at the cost” of higher prices for current 
consumers). 
18 See MARK A. LEMLEY & DAN L. BURK, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE 
IT 137-45 (2009) (detailing the many industries in which patents may do more harm than good and 
describing the few instances in which patent rights may be socially valuable). 
19 Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 YALE 
L.J. 1590 (2011) (explaining the economic value of patents and proposing when they should and 
should not be granted). 
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civil or criminal—for infringement.  If creators and inventors are already getting 
inappropriately strong rights in their works, enhancing their rights through greater 
enforcement will only further tip the balance in their favor. 
 We do not mean to minimize these concerns—as noted, we agree with 
them to some extent.  Nonetheless, we think that it is important to take the basic 
economic assumptions seriously as an initial matter. First, if economic analysis 
does not support criminal sanctions in a world that behaves according to 
economic theory, then we need not even bother analyzing those sanctions when 
adherence to economic theory is relaxed.  This, as we noted above, we believe to 
be the case for criminal patent sanctions.  Second, we and others may be wrong to 
doubt the importance of intellectual property in inducing research, development, 
and creativity.  If that is the case, it will be necessary to consider what remedies 
should be applied in the event of infringement.  Accordingly, we will proceed as 
if patent and copyright law play some role in incentivizing innovation (as they are 
meant to) and Congress has properly balanced the interests of creators and the 
public.  On this account, IP infringement will harm both the IP owner and society 
at large (which will lose some benefits from future creativity), though it is 
difficult to know to what degree. 
 
B. The Economics of Criminal Law: Incarceration, Damages, and 
Deterrence  
 
 The economic goal of any set of laws is to produce the greatest possible 
benefits at the lowest possible cost—in other words, to generate the maximum 
achievable net benefits.20  Criminal and tort laws are of course directed at 
deterring costly behavior, and so the “benefits” produced by these laws come in 
the form of crimes and accidents that have been avoided.21  The law’s objective is 
to deter as much harm as possible while imposing the fewest costs.22  From an 
economic perspective, criminal law and punitive incarceration at first seem to 
present puzzles.  Prison time generates very substantial economic costs, costs that 
are imposed upon the prisoner, his23 friends and family, and the government that 
20 A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 (1983) (outlining a 
utilitarian theory of law centered on the maximization of net benefits). 
21 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167-71(describing the theory of optimal 
tort damages). 
22 Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 762 (1998) 
(“Utilitarianism, for example, encourages architects of punishment to get the most deterrence at 
the lowest possible cost.”) . 
23 Because the vast majority of incarcerated prisoners are male, we will employ the male pronoun 
here though it is not standard convention. 
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is charged with imprisoning him.24  The principal economic objective of 
punishment is deterrence, and tort law should be able to efficiently deter 
misconduct through monetary sanctions alone.  Moreover, while tort lawsuits 
might involve significant transactions costs, the civil fines themselves are not 
economic costs but rather transfer payments from one party to another that 
involve little or no efficiency loss.25   On this account, prison sentences would 
seem unnecessarily wasteful.26 The economic justification for criminal law lies 
with the possibility that defendants will be insolvent or otherwise judgment-proof.   
Consider a straightforward case of assault.  An assault victim might suffer 
damages in the tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars in medical bills and 
lost wages, not to mention pain and suffering.  The perpetrator of an assault may 
not have assets worth nearly that much, and thus it might be impossible to collect 
the necessary measure of damages.  (This is the reason that many states require 
automobile drivers to have insurance—in order to guard against otherwise 
judgment-proof defendants.)  If the amount of damages is set at a figure that 
exceeds the perpetrator’s ability to pay, there is no reason for him to avoid 
committing the act.  The judgment-proof defendant cannot be effectively deterred.  
This problem is of course much more severe for more serious harms, such as 
murder, and it is accentuated by the fact that not every harm is detected and 
punished.   
In order to achieve optimal deterrence, standard economic theory suggests 
that the expected penalty imposed upon the defendant must be equivalent to the 
defendant’s likely gain from the crime.27  The expected penalty is the likelihood 
24 See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment, 76 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1039-44 (2009) (hereinafter Happiness and Punishment) (describing the 
hedonic costs of incarceration). 
25 See Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1357, 1418 (2003) (“the payment is a transfer made to satisfy a demand, and thus is not an 
economic loss”). 
26 The contrast we draw in this article is between monetary penalties and incarceration.  We realize 
that this contrast does not map perfectly onto the line between criminal and civil penalties: 
criminal fines are quite common, and non-punitive civil incarceration exists as well.  In some 
cases there will be important differences between civil tort damages and criminal fines.  However, 
the distinction between monetary penalties and incarceration is the most stark and important 
contrast between criminal and civil law, and it is the one that matters most from an economic 
perspective because the two types of penalties are experienced so differently by offenders.  
Accordingly, we focus our attention upon this critical distinction while acknowledging the nuance 
involved in both civil and criminal sanctions.  Henceforth, when we refer to “criminal” penalties 
we primarily mean incarceration, and when we refer to “civil” penalties we mean monetary 
sanctions.  In this Part we will also refer to some alternative criminal sanctions that might deter 
infringement, as we did in Part II with respect to copyright. 
27 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 181-
184 (1968). 
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that a defendant will be detected, apprehended, and fined, multiplied by the 
magnitude of the sanction that will be imposed.28  Imagine that it is worth 
$10,000 to a hypothetical perpetrator of assault to be able to commit that act, but 
the perpetrator has only a 40% chance of being caught.  To deter the assault, the 
law would have to set the sanction at $25,000 ($10,000 / 0.40), an amount that 
many assault defendants may not possess. 
 As the foregoing discussion indicates, criminal damages are set not by the 
harm done to the victim—as tort damages are—but by the benefit from the crime 
to the perpetrator.29  Because the majority of torts involve unintentional harms, 
tort damages must be equal to the expected harm in order to induce potential 
tortfeasors to take all efficient precautions.  On the other hand, many crimes 
involve intentional conduct, and the issue is not the level of precaution but the 
criminal’s conscious decision to commit the crime in the first instance.  
Accordingly, the penalty need only be high enough such that the criminal will be 
in a better situation if he refrains from committing the crime than if he commits it.  
In many cases, this means that surprisingly low criminal penalties may be 
appropriate.  For instance, the appropriate penalty for some murders might be 
only a few years in prison, despite the terrible harm involved in murder.  The 
reason is that many murderers might gain very little benefit from their crimes, and 
murderers are apprehended and prosecuted at relatively high rates.  Accordingly, 
in economic terms, it is not necessary that the punishment match the crime. 
 However, this analysis is muddied somewhat when one considers optimal 
activity and precaution levels.  One goal of tort law is to avoid over-deterrence: it 
makes no sense for potential tortfeasors to take precautions that are more 
expensive than the damages that they might cause.30  For instance, imagine that 
an automobile driver has a 10% chance of causing an accident that will result in 
$10,000 in damages.  Suppose, however, that tort damages are set at $50,000, 
rather than $10,000, in the event of an accident.  The driver would now have an 
incentive to take a precaution costing $5,000 ($50,000 x 0.10) despite the fact that 
28 Emmett H. Miller III, Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizational Defendants, 46 VAND. 
L. REV. 197, 206 (1993) (“Thus, under both approaches, the expected gain or harm represents the 
actual gain or harm resulting from the offense multiplied by the probability of detection and 
conviction.”). 
29 Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, Pt. II, bk. 1, ch. 3, in J. BENTHAM’S WORKS 396, 402 
(J. Bowring ed., 1843) (“If the apparent magnitude, or rather value of that pain be greater than the 
apparent magnitude or value of the pleasure or good he expects to be the consequence of the act, 
he will be absolutely prevented from performing it.”). 
30 Kyle D. Logue, Coordinating Sanctions in Tort, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2313, 2324 (2010) 
(explaining that tort law seeks to avoid over-deterrence). 
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the expected cost of the damage that this driver will cause is only $1000 ($10,000 
x 0.10).  Excessive tort damages lead to inefficient behavior.31 
 But while this analysis applies straightforwardly to accidents and cases of 
negligence, its application to intentional harms is not nearly so clear.  Society is 
willing to accept that some accidents may occur in the course of lawful driving 
because it would be too expensive to take every precaution necessary to prevent 
them entirely.  Accordingly, the optimal level of accidents is non-zero.32  Yet it 
may be that there is no “precaution” against intentional murder that is not worth 
taking.  That is, there is nothing that an individual could do to guard against 
committing an intentional crime—that is, in deciding not to commit the crime—
that would not be less costly than committing that crime.  Accordingly, the 
optimal level of intentional murder might be exactly zero.  If this is the case, 
damages for murder and other serious intentional crimes should be infinite.  
Indeed, the strongest economic argument typically made against very high 
penalties for serious intentional crimes is the need for marginal deterrence, not the 
desire to avoid over-deterrence.   
Marginal deterrence is the idea that more serious crimes should be 
punished more harshly than less serious crimes in order to deter criminals who 
might cause a less serious harm from instead causing a more serious harm.33  For 
instance, if assault and murder were both punished by life in prison, a criminal 
who has committed assault would have no incentive not to commit murder (in an 
attempt to flee, for instance) because he would face no greater penalty.34  The 
necessity of marginal deterrence means that the penalty for very serious crimes 
such as aggravated assault (the optimal level of which is zero) should not, in fact, 
be as serious as the penalty for murder.   
Marginal deterrence also provides some of the reason that policymakers 
have turned to expensive criminal sanctions like imprisonment, rather than relying 
solely on monetary penalties.  If someone is contemplating causing $100,000 
worth of harm but only has the means to pay a $50,000 judgment, then there is no 
incentive for him not to cause $200,000 worth of harm—he will reap the extra 
benefit without being subject to any additional risk.  The threat of a prison 
31 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.1 (7th ed. 2007) (describing a 
general theory of tort law and efficient behavior). 
32 Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Markets: 
Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 718 (“In standard torts cases, the optimal level of 
accidents is not zero.”). 
33 Eyal Zadir and Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics: Integrating Moral Constraints 
with Economic Analysis, 96 CAL. L. REV. 323, 379 n. 211 (2008) (noting that economic theory 
requires marginal deterrence if a criminal is to have an incentive not to commit a more serious 
crime). 
34 Id. 
10 
 
                                                 
sentence, which will take from him a resource of which he has a significant 
stock—his liberty—will reintroduce a deterrent effect that will prevent the greater 
harm.  Because prison sentences can be scaled in terms of their length and their 
severity, the law can create marginal deterrence along a much wider spectrum of 
harm-causing behavior. 
 Finally, even if every potential defendant were properly capitalized and 
able to pay the full measure of damages required after causing harm, there might 
nonetheless be some individuals who could not be deterred.  This could be due to 
mental instability, a tendency to succumb to fits of rage, over-optimism 
(regarding the chances of being caught), or any number of other factors that cause 
the individual to fall short of perfect rational calculation.35  Incapacitation is the 
proper remedy with respect to such individuals.36   And of course incapacitation 
can only be achieved via incarceration, not monetary damages. 
 Accordingly, carceral criminal sanctions are justifiable from an economic 
perspective because of difficulties in properly deterring potential offenders, most 
frequently because they are insolvent or unable to pay the full judgments against 
them.  This central point will inform much of the discussion that follows. 
 
C. Property (and Intellectual Property) Crimes 
 
 The foregoing discussion focused on harms involving injury to a person.  
This is appropriate, as these are the most serious types of crime and present the 
clearest case for criminal incarceration.  Yet our true focus is on property crimes.  
This is an Article about intellectual property, and property crimes such as theft 
demand a separate economic justification.  Unlike harms involving personal 
injuries, there is no obvious economic harm when someone commits a property 
crime.  Destroying someone’s home or wrecking a car would certainly create 
economic harm, but if a thief merely steals a piece of property, nothing of value is 
destroyed—the property still exists.  Perhaps the theft is just a transfer from one 
user to another, not an efficiency loss.  If there is no economic harm from theft, 
then there is no economic reason to punish it with criminal sanctions. 
 Although this reasoning may seem intuitive, there are nonetheless 
powerful arguments that theft creates economic harm.  The first is that theft may 
result in an item being transferred from a higher-value user to a lower-value user, 
35 See Jonathan S. Masur et al., For General Deterrence, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS (Paul 
Robinson et al., eds.) (2009) (describing the types of criminals who cannot be deterred through 
rational means).  
36 See SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 
120-22 (9th ed. 2012) (explaining a general theory of incapacitation). 
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which decreases overall welfare.37  If an automobile is worth $10,000 to its owner 
and only $5,000 to the thief who steals it, then the theft destroys $5,000 in value 
just by virtue of the fact that the automobile is transferred from the owner to the 
thief.  By blocking these types of involuntary transactions, the law forces 
individuals into the world of voluntary transactions through which property finds 
its way to the highest-value user.  Because inventions and creative works are non-
rival, however, this argument does not apply in the context of intellectual 
property.  “Theft” of intellectual property does not deprive the original owner of 
its use, so there can be no fear that a higher-value owner has been deprived.  We 
must, accordingly, look elsewhere for economic justifications for (intellectual) 
property crimes. 
  Theft may also create economic harm by reducing incentives to efficiently 
maintain or improve property.38  If property owners have to fear that their 
property might imminently be stolen, they will have no reason to invest in 
improving that property, even when it is efficient to do so.39  Individuals might 
even shy away from acquiring property in the first place, even if they would be 
higher-value users than the current owners.  This argument has particular 
resonance for IP.     If someone “steals” intellectual property—that is, infringe it 
without having to pay royalties to the owner—the owner will be able to earn only 
competitive returns, rather than monopoly profits.  As noted above, economic 
theory justifies the ability to earn monopoly profits on copyrighted works and 
patented inventions because competitive returns will be inadequate to incentivize 
intellectual property owners to create and commercialize their ideas.  
Accordingly, IP “theft” could reduce incentives to invent or create IP, just as theft 
of real or chattel property might reduce incentives to acquire or improve that 
property.  This would frustrate the economic rationales underlying intellectual 
property. 
 The third and final argument that theft causes economic harm relates to the 
steps that owners will take to protect their property from theft.  Imagine a country 
that decriminalized theft (or that had unreliable police, prosecutors, and courts).  
Without the state to protect their property, citizens of that country would 
understand that their property was at risk of being taken if they did not protect it 
37 Richard A. Posner, Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1196 
(1985) (“[Property is] less valuable in an economic sense in [the] hands [of a thief.]”). 
38 See Manta, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 477 (“The most obvious harm[] 
caused by violations such as theft . . . [is] the potential disincentive for . . . owners to engage in 
future productive and socially beneficial endeavors because their resulting profits are at risk of 
being stolen.”). 
39 Id. (describing the incentives of property owners in a world where theft is rampant). 
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themselves.40  Consequently, they would build high walls around their homes, 
install security systems, hire armed guards, train vicious guard dogs, and so 
forth.41  These are socially wasteful activities.  They produce little social value, 
and they exist only to prevent the transfer of property from one user to another.  
Economists thus view the criminal prohibition on theft as a less costly means of 
protecting property.42  Rather than giving private property owners incentives to 
invest in wasteful self-help, economists favor centralizing the task of protecting 
property in the government, a body that can take advantage of economies of 
scale.43 
 This rationale also has relevance for IP law.  Copyright owners have a 
number of available avenues of self-help, including (perhaps most importantly) 
digital rights management (DRM).44  For patent owners, the mechanism for 
engaging in self-help is to shift from patents to trade secrets—literally locking 
innovation secrets away behind closed doors instead of disclosing them to the 
public.45  We will discuss these mechanisms in much greater detail below.  For 
now, the general point is that IP owners, like other property owners, may use 
expensive self-help as an alternative if legal prohibitions on theft appear 
inadequate. 
40 See George P. Fletcher, The Metamorphosis of Larceny, 89 HARV. L. REV. 469, 474 (1976) 
(“[T]he thief upset[s] the social order not only by threatening property, but by violating the general 
sense of security and well-being of the community; . . . theft [is] feared as a socially unnerving 
event.”). 
41 Posner, supra note 37, at 1196 (“[I]f [a thief is] allowed to take the car [of his neighbor, his] 
neighbor will have an incentive to expend resources on preventing it from being taken, and these 
expenditures considered as a whole, yield no social product.”); see also Robert P. Merges, Peter 
Seth Menell & Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age (6th ed. 
2012) (making this point about trade secrets). 
42 Id. (arguing the role of the criminal law is discoursing market bypassing); see also William E. 
Nelson, Emerging Notions of Modern Criminal Law in the Revolutionary Era: An Historical 
Perspective, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 465 (1967) (examining criminal law’s historical development 
from an instrument enforcing the community’s moral values to one focused on “deter[ring] attacks 
on property”). 
43  See e.g., Polinsky, Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 107 
(“[T]he benefits from coordinating enforcement-for example, avoiding duplication of investigative 
effort and exploiting economies of scale in information processing-are obtained under public 
enforcement and monopolistic enforcement, but not under competitive enforcement.”). Cf. Amitai 
Aviram, Allocating Regulatory Resources, 37 J. CORP. L. 739, 765 (2012) (“[P]rivate actors are 
often poor enforcers because they lack the economies of scale (such as investigative expertise and 
litigation experience) that come with repeated enforcement, and because most people have fewer 
financial means to pursue enforcement than public actors.”). 
44 See infra Part II. 
45 J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 917, 923 (2011) (describing the 
tradeoffs between trade secret and patent protection and the decisions faced by innovators). 
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There is one final distinctive feature of property crimes worth addressing, 
and it is the likelihood that a thief (as opposed to, say, a murderer) would be able 
to pay off a civil judgment.  At first glance it might appear that property criminals 
are less likely to be judgment-proof than criminals who have injured a person.  
One reason is that property crimes often cause less harm than personal injury 
crimes.  Another reason is that a thief will often have one asset that can be used to 
pay the judgment: the stolen property itself.  This is not a panacea; as we 
explained above, the proper measure of damages for a crime might well be many 
times greater than the actual harm caused if the probability of detection and 
punishment is low.  But it nevertheless places property criminals on a somewhat 
different footing than criminals who injure other people. 
 
* * * 
 
 We have identified a number of factors relevant to the question of whether 
criminal penalties should be applied to prevent some type of undesirable activity.  
In the interest of clarity, we summarize those factors here: 
 
1.  What is the magnitude of the economic harm from the activity, and 
what are the benefits to the infringer? 
 
2.  What is the probability that violations will be detected and prosecuted? 
 
3.  Will the defendant likely have sufficient funds to pay a judgment? 
 
 4.  Is the economically efficient activity level zero or greater than zero? 
 
 5.  Will it be desirable to incapacitate offenders? 
 
In the Parts that follow, we consider the issue of criminal sanctions for copyright 
and patent infringement through the economic lens of these factors. 
 
II.  THE LIMITED CASE FOR CRIMINAL COPYRIGHT LIABILITY 
 
 Over the course of the last century, the availability of criminal sanctions 
for copyright infringement has expanded dramatically.46  Driven in large part by 
46 I. Trotter Hardy, Criminal Copyright Infringement, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305, 315 
(2002) (hereinafter Criminal Copyright).  Congress enacted the first criminal copyright statute in 
1897.  It applied only to the unauthorized performance of plays and music.  See Act of Jan. 6, 
1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481.  In 1909, Congress expanded liability to cover all copyrightable works.  
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lobbying from the Recording Industry Association of American (RIAA) and the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), criminal copyright law has 
grown to cover a wider variety of content and behavior, and the penalties for 
violations have multiplied.47  According to these advocacy groups, criminal 
sanctions, including substantial imprisonment terms, are needed to deter the rising 
tide of copyright “theft.”48 
 This Part addresses those arguments from the perspective of economic 
analysis of law.  We suggest that, according to the standard economic account of 
criminal law, there might be narrow situations in which criminal sanctions could 
be theoretically justified for deterring copyright violations and improving overall 
social welfare. Below, we describe when criminal copyright liability might be 
valuable and when it might not, and we assess current U.S. copyright law in light 
of our findings. 
 
A.  The Harm of Copyright Infringement 
 
 Economic analysis suggests that criminal law can be valuable in situations 
where people must be deterred from conduct that reduces overall social welfare.49  
When people steal, rape, and kill the reduction in social welfare and the need for 
deterrence is obvious. In Part I, we explained how and when criminal sanctions 
can be used to reduce occurrences of these behaviors. But in what way is illegally 
downloading a song or streaming a bootlegged signal of a soccer match 
equivalent to these heinous acts?  How is watching a pre-release version of the 
latest blockbuster movie a crime?  From an economic perspective, the answer 
See Copyright Act of 1090, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075. Over the last quarter of the twentieth century, 
Congress further expanded criminal liability and enhanced the magnitude of criminal penalties.  
Copyright infringement could result in felony convictions, defendants could be found guilty even 
in the absence of a purpose for financial gain, and maximum sentence lengths grew. Piracy and 
Counterfeiting Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-180, 96 Stat. 91 (creating felony liability 
for copyright violations); No Electronic Theft (NET) Act of 1997, Pub. L. NO. 105-147, 111 Stat. 
2678-80 (amending the criminal provisions to allow criminal conviction in the absence of a 
showing that the defendant was motivated by commercial purpose or financial gain); Sentecing 
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (extending maximum sentence length for 
criminal copyright violation from two to five years of imprisonment). 
47 See Brian P. Heneghan, The NET Act, Fair Use, and Willfulness – Is Congress Making a 
Scarecrow of the Law?, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 27, 28 (2002) (noting that the Net Act “enjoys strong 
support from the Software Publishers Association, U.S. Copyright Office, the Department of 
Justice, Adobe Software, Microsoft Corporation, the Recording Industry of America, and the 
Motion Picture Association of America”). 
48 On property metaphors in copyright, see WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT 
WARS (2009). 
49 See supra Part I. 
15 
 
                                                                                                                                     
depends on the extent to which copyright infringement causes harm that cannot be 
deterred by other means.  Copyright infringement can enter the domain of 
criminal law when other mechanisms for deterring socially harmful conduct, 
including civil sanctions and self-help remedies, are either too costly or 
unsuccessful.50  
 
 1.  Copyright Infringement and Incentives 
 
 In order to determine the extent to which deterrence, whether criminal or 
otherwise, is appropriate, we must first understand the harms caused by the 
unauthorized copying of creative works.  Although copyright is a form of 
intellectual property, and although many people refer to copyright infringement as 
“theft,”51 infringement is importantly different from theft of real or personal 
property.52  With copyright infringement, the original owner is not deprived of the 
use of the infringed content.53  When someone illegally photocopies a novel, the 
copyright owner is not prevented from reading the novel herself.  But the issue is 
not with the copyright owner’s use of the novel but with her incentives to write it 
in the first place.  The harm of unauthorized copying arises from the public goods 
problem in IP and the law’s solution to that problem.54  When someone 
downloads a song for free off the internet rather than paying for it on iTunes, the 
creator’s ex ante incentives to create diminish.  For every person who opts out of 
an available market transaction for the song, the creator will tend to invest that 
much less in the quality and quantity of new songs she produces. And if enough 
50 Moohr, Overcriminalization, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 7-8 (“Whether 
criminal penalties are an appropriate way to deal with copyright infringement depends on whether 
the strategy confers a net social benefit, which is found in intellectual property policy.”). 
51 During Congressional hearings on the NET Act, Senator Patrick Leahy declared, “Just as we 
will not tolerate the theft of software, CDs or books from a store, so we will not tolerate the 
stealing of intellectual property over the Internet.” Copyright Piracy on the Internet: Hearing on 
H.R. 2265 before the House Subcomm. On Courts and Intellectual Property of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997).  See also Green, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 
240 (noting that many recently enacted criminal IP laws have in common “at least a literal 
commitment to the idea that intellectual property of various sorts might be subject to ‘theft’ or to 
being ‘stolen.’”).  
52 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the difference between copyright infringement and 
theft of real or personal property. In Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985), the Court rejected 
the government’s interpretation of the National Stolen Property Act that “would make theft, 
conversion, or fraud equivalent to wrongful appropriation of statutorily protected rights in 
copyright.” 
53 Dowling v. U.S., 473 U.S. at 216 (“The copyright owner…holds no ordinary chattel. A 
copyright, like other intellectual property, comprises a series of carefully defined and carefully 
delimited interests to which the law affords correspondingly exact protections.”). 
54 See supra Part I.A. 
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people download songs for free rather than paying for them, the creator may cease 
making music altogether.  To ensure that the appropriate level of incentives 
remains, people must be deterred from making unauthorized copies of works. 
 
 2.  The Efficient Level of Copying 
 
 Like theft and murder, unauthorized copying of expressive works can 
create harm and reduce overall social welfare.  But unlike theft and murder, where 
the optimal amount of those behaviors is at or very near zero, the optimal amount 
of unauthorized copying may be significantly greater than zero.  Certain kinds of 
copying may be beneficial, and deterring them would be harmful.55  
 First, as we noted in Part I.A, the ability to charge monopoly prices above 
marginal cost creates deadweight losses that can be inefficient. For example, 
imagine that the marginal cost of producing a copy of a movie is $2.  Because the 
copyright owner has an exclusive right to copy the movie, she can charge $10 for 
a copy of the movie.  The owner’s ability to sell the movie at $10 to the many 
people who value having a copy of the movie at $10 or greater provides the owner 
with the opportunity to recoup her investment.  But what if some person values 
the movie at $5? He is unwilling to pay the price for the movie, and, without the 
ability for the owner to price discriminate,56 the difference between what he is 
willing to pay and the marginal cost of the copy represents inefficient, deadweight 
loss.57   
The situation here is different from that of theft of real property.  As 
William Landes and Richard Posner explain: 
 
55 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 325, 335 (1989) (“Some copyright protection is necessary to generate the incentives to 
incur the costs of creating easily copied works, but too much protection can raise the costs of 
creation for subsequent authors to the point where those authors cannot cover them even though 
they have complete copyright protection for their own originality.”). 
56 Price discrimination can occur in some situations involving copyrightable works. For example, 
copyright owners charge higher prices for hardback editions and first-run movies because some 
people value being able to consume the work rapidly.  See LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE, supra note 8, at 39.  Price discrimination is also possible through the use of digital 
rights management technologies (DRM), which we discuss infra at Part II.B.1. 
57 See Eric Goldman, A Road to No Warez: The No Electronic Theft Act and Criminal Copyright 
Infringement, 82 OR. L. REV. 369, 426-31 (2003); Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, 
Seventeen Famous Economists Weigh in on Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, and 
Network Effects, 18 HARV. J. L. TECH. 435, 440-41 (2005) (“Copyright engenders a deadweight 
loss as a by-product of the incentives to create that it provides. A system of private ownership 
providing the incentive for creation cannot give a reward to the creator without also having an 
apparent deadweight loss in the consumption market.”). 
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If a thief steals a Rolls-Royce from the dealer’s lot, it is no consolation to 
the dealer that the thief was not a potential customer because he could not 
afford to pay the dealer’s price; the theft deprived the dealer the 
opportunity to sell the Rolls to someone else. But when the purchaser of a 
software program makes a copy for someone else, he does not reduce the 
number of copies in the software producer’s inventory.  If the someone 
else was not a potential purchaser from the producer, the producer loses 
nothing from the unauthorized copying.”58  
 
Thus, if the owner is able to sufficiently recoup her investment in the movie, 
deterring people who value the work at above marginal cost but below the 
copyright owner’s price may be unnecessary or even counter-productive.   
 Second, and more importantly, some unauthorized uses of a work might 
be efficient and socially valuable but nonetheless fail to arise due to market 
failures.  Although economic analysis generally trusts markets to efficiently 
allocate goods to valuable uses,59 some users of copyrighted works engage in a 
variety of behaviors that are unlikely to result in market transactions.  For 
example, authors of copyrighted works are unlikely to license use of their works 
to others for criticism and parody, yet these are generally believed to be socially 
beneficial activities.60  In other situations, transaction costs may prevent otherwise 
efficient bargains from arising.61 Someone wishing the transform a work or use it 
in a way that creates significant value that she is unable to capture may be 
unwilling to pay the necessary licensing fee.  In these situations, the “fair use” 
provisions of the U.S. copyright act allow others the right to freely use 
copyrighted works, because those uses are considered to be welfare-enhancing 
and because market transactions are unlikely to provide them in sufficient 
quantity.62   
58 See LANDES & POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 8, at 47.  The authors give the 
example of weak demand for AIDS drugs in Africa. 
59 See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1 (1960) (explaining how, in 
a world without transaction costs, voluntary market transactions will result in entitlements being 
owned by their highest valuing user).  
60 See Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won’t Sell: Parody, Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright 
Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 79, 85-90 (1991). 
61 See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Creativity Effect, 78 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 31 (2011) (describing inefficiencies in IP markets that may arise from biased assessments of 
a work’s value); Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: 
An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2010) (same). 
62 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1604–05 (1982). 
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 Deterring the behaviors discussed above is not valuable.63 They tend to 
create significant benefits with relatively little harm to creators’ incentives.  Uses 
of a copyrighted work for criticism, parody, or education make many people’s 
lives better off, and the inability to charge for them is unlikely to deter creation.64  
Although they may marginally decrease incentives to create, the optimal amount 
of these behaviors is decidedly above zero. 
 Other uses of a work, however, will tend to generate little benefit but have 
significant social costs.  When people download copies of movies or songs for 
free when they would have been willing to pay the copyright owner’s price they 
are creating inefficiencies.  Assuming that the law has properly balanced the costs 
and benefits of copyright protection,65 this diminution in the copyright owner’s 
ability to recoup her investment costs is harmful.66 
 
B.  The Economics of Deterring Copyright Infringement 
 
 The unauthorized copying of expressive works, at least in some instances, 
can harm social welfare by undermining the incentives of authors to invest in their 
creations.  Deterring these cases of unauthorized copying would be valuable.  
Economic analysis describes the various tools that might be brought to bear to do 
so, including private self-help and public law solutions.67  This section explores 
63 Landes & Posner, JLS, supra note 55, at 340 (“An increase in copyright protection is likely to 
reduce the welfare benefits (consumer plus producer surplus) generated by a given work—
assuming it will be created.”). 
64 See Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property 
Internalism, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 970 (2012). 
65 As noted above, we believe that Congress has done a poor job of balancing the incentives of 
authors with the rights of the public. Copyright terms are far too long, and the scope of copyright 
holders’ rights is far too broad. See Christopher Buccafusco & Paul Heald, Do Bad Things Happen 
When Works Enter the Public Domain?: Empirical Tests of Copyright Term Extension, BERK. 
TECH. L. J. (forthcoming 2013) (presenting empirical data which suggest that the works suffer 
little economic harm when they enter the public domain); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 57.   
66 Recent empirical research on the effects of music and movie downloading on sales has 
suggested significant decreases in sales as a result of downloading.  Stan Liebowitz, File-sharing: 
Creative Destruction or Just Plain Destruction?: J. L. & ECON. 1 (2006).  We wish to emphasize 
again, however, that a mere decrease in sales does not alone show that overall social welfare has 
been diminished.  See also Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing 
on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 J. POL. ECON. 1 (2007).  Irina Manta compares the 
harm of copyright infringement to vandalism. Manta, Puzzle, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 475. 
67 As Trotter Hardy notes, owners of informational goods do not necessarily require copyright 
protection.  They have a variety of techniques available to them.  Hardy describes four different 
types of protection against unauthorized copying: “1) entitlement-like protection; 2) contract-like 
protection; 3) state-of-the-art limitations; and 4) special purpose technical limitations.”  Trotter 
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the effectiveness and desirability of self-help and civil law sanctions in the 
copyright context. 
 
 1.  Self-help and DRM 
 
 Like owners of real property who attempt to prevent others from 
trespassing on their land by building fences, copyright owners who seek to deter 
unauthorized copying can attempt to limit access or use of their works.  
Traditionally, this was a difficult task for copyright owners. Once a book was put 
into circulation, there was little the copyright owner could do to prevent others 
from copying it, lending it, or performing it publicly.  Copyright law and the civil 
sanctions it creates are a response to this problem.  With the rise of digital copies 
of expressive works that are embodied in computer software and hardware, 
however, copyright owners can create technological limits on the things that users 
can do with copies.  Known as digital rights management (DRM), these 
technological measures can limit the ability of users to make copies of a work, to 
transfer the work between different devices, or to modify the work.68  
 DRM can be very attractive to copyright owners because it can provide 
almost total control over the behavior of users.69  For example, if the copyright 
owner of a movie makes copies of the movie available in video cassettes, a 
purchaser of a video cassette could easily copy the movie for a number of her 
friends with only limited loss in quality.  Some of these friends might have been 
potential purchasers of the movie, and their ability to get the free copy could harm 
the copyright owner.  Now, however, the copyright owner can release the movie 
on a DVD that is coded with DRM software that prevents the purchaser from 
making copies.70  The same is potentially true for purchasers of ebooks, CDs, 
software, and other digital content that is downloaded online.   
 Although DRM seems like an efficient self-help measure to prevent 
unauthorized copying, its use is highly controversial,71 and its overall effect on 
social welfare is probably negative.  DRM’s principal economic benefit is that it 
Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEG. F. 217, 223.  Our analysis will 
primarily focus on the first and fourth techniques that Hardy mentions. 
68 Stefan Bechtold, The Present and Future of Digital Rights Management: Musings on Emerging 
Legal Problems, in DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT: TECHNOLOGICAL, ECONOMIC, LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL ASPECTS 597 (Eberhard Becker et al., eds. 2003). 
69 Dan L. Burk, Anti-Circumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1100 (2003) (“Copyright 
holders might prefer a world in which the rights granted under statute or asserted via license 
became self-enforcing. Something close to this can be achieved through the employment of 
technological devices accompanying copies of a work as they are distributed.”). 
70 Id. 
71 See Bechtold, supra note 68, at 598. 
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can be relatively cheaply created and implemented.  Coding DRM software is not 
difficult, and, once created, including the DRM code in copies of a work is 
effectively costless for the producer.72  Accordingly, it is unlike the relatively 
costly self-help measures that property owners must create and maintain to 
prevent trespass or theft.73  To prevent someone from stealing a book from a 
store, the owner must pay security personnel or install other physical detection 
devices in each copy.  To prevent someone from making unauthorized copies of 
an ebook, the producer simply needs to include a string of code in the ebook 
digital file.74  
Despite its ease and low cost, DRM might be an inefficient solution to the 
problem of unauthorized copying of expressive works.75  First, users of many 
kinds of products object to the limitations that DRM establishes.  Consumers of 
music, movies, and software have developed norms about the kinds of uses that 
should be allowed, and they balk when content providers attempt to restrict those 
uses.  Recently, in response to consumer complaints, Apple’s iTunes service and 
other online music distributors have dramatically scaled back their use of DRM.  
Similarly, consumers have expressed dismay at Microsoft’s announcement that it 
will include highly restrictive DRM provisions in the release of its new Xbox 
game console.76  Although DRM still places a major role in attempting to protect 
against unauthorized uses of movies, ebooks, and computer software, there is 
reason to think that negative consumer responses will increasingly limit its 
effectivenessaddition, DRM has proven less valuable than was hoped, because the 
code can be circumvented.  Programmers who desire to use a work in a way that 
is forbidden by DRM can “hack” the code and nullify its effectiveness.77  As with 
72 Of course, consumers may prefer to own copies of works that are not encrypted with DRM, so 
the amount they are willing the pay for DRM-encrypted copies will be less.  Consumer resistance 
to DRM likely had some effect on Apple’s decision to release music on iTunes in “DRM-free” 
versions.  Yet even these versions are not truly DRM free as they only allow purchasers to play 
songs on a limited number of devices.   
73 See supra note Part I.B. 
74 See Bechtold, supra note 68, at 598. 
75 Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights 
Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 471 (1998) (“Digital technologies allow more effective 
fencing of intellectual property, and thus cure some of the market failure problems associated with 
creative and informational works—although…they have the potential to create market failures of a 
different sort.”); Burk, supra note 69, at 1097 (arguing that “the anticircumvention right is being, 
and will continue to be, abused.”). 
76 Anthony Tosie, Nintendo Disagrees with Microsoft’s DRM Policies, Neowin (June 13, 2013) 
available at http://www.neowin.net/news/nintendo-disagrees-with-microsofts-drm-policies. 
77 Burk, supra note 69, at1102 (“The drawback to reliance primarily upon technological controls is 
that technically sophisticated users may find ways to circumvent or disable the control system, and 
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real or personal property, this leads to an inefficient “arms race” between content 
producers and hackers as they each expend costly resources attempting to 
alternately protect and break DRM code.  Although initially creating and 
installing the DRM is inexpensive, creating multiple iterations of the code to 
outpace hackers can get very expensive.  In the U.S., the law has attempted to 
avert this arms race by prohibiting the circumvention of technological barriers to 
use.  The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) prohibits the use or 
distribution of circumvention measures and subjects violators to civil and criminal 
penalties.78  
 While the DMCA minimizes the risk of an inefficient arms race between 
content providers and hackers, DRM-based self-help creates other significant 
inefficiencies.  As noted above, not all unauthorized copying of expressive works 
is harmful to social welfare. Many unauthorized uses of copyrighted works, 
especially those classified as fair uses under the copyright act, significantly 
enhance social welfare.  As yet, and perhaps inevitably, DRM technology is 
unable to distinguish between infringing and noninfringing uses of protected 
works.79  DRM affects the professor who wants to excerpt a portion of a book for 
educational purposes in class just as much as it does the e-book purchaser who 
wants to make copies of the file for all of his friends.  While the latter use is 
welfare diminishing, the former is welfare enhancing, but both are prohibited by 
DRM.   
 Users who wish to make socially valuable fair uses of a DRM-protected 
work can attempt to circumvent the technological protection, but they do so at 
considerable risk.  First, although the Librarian of Congress exempts certain uses 
of copyrighted works from the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA,80 
U.S. courts have not agreed about whether every fair use of a copyrighted work is 
exempt.81 Accordingly, unless users fall within one of the express exemptions 
may even assist unsophisticated users in doing so. A skilled user may be able to ‘hack around’ the 
controls built into technological content systems.”). 
78 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a).  It is important to note that violation of the DMCA anti-circumvention 
provisions is not considered violation of copyright.  DMCA violations create independent civil 
and criminal liability.  Hardy, Criminal Copyright, supra note 46, at 322. 
79 Stefan Bechtold discusses the possibility of creating DRM technologies that can distinguish 
between appropriate and inappropriate uses of a protected work. Bechtold, supra note 68, at 604. 
80 Burk, supra note 69, at 1104. 
81 Court opinions have differed on the relationship between DMCA and fair use.  Compare 
Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc., 421 F.3d 1307, 1318-19 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (holding that a copyright holder must show a connection to copyright infringement in 
order to succeed in a claim under the DMCA); Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, 
Inc. 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that distribution of a circumvention device--in that 
case a garage door opener--did not violate the anti-circumvention provisions because its use did 
not lead to any copyright violation) with Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 
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(which appear to change annually), they risk being subject to heavy civil and 
criminal fines and possibly imprisonment.  Second, even if circumvention of 
DRM is acceptable for fair use of a work, the contours of the fair use doctrine are 
notoriously fuzzy.  Whether a given behavior is copyright infringement or fair use 
depends on a difficult-to-predict balancing of multiple factors.  Risk averse parties 
whose conduct lies on the boundaries of fair use may elect to avoid engaging in 
potentially valuable behavior to avoid liability under the DMCA.82   
 Individuals’ willingness and ability to circumvent DRM creates a perverse 
effect on the kinds of copying that does and does not get prevented by DRM.  
Law-abiding individuals who wish to make fair or personal uses of copyrighted 
content will generally also be those who are unable or unwilling to circumvent 
DRM technology, while those individuals who engage in large scale direct 
copying of works for economic or reputational reasons will tend to be able and 
willing to hack DRM code.  This means that DRM tends to have its greatest 
deterrent effect on socially valuable conduct and only limited effect on harmful 
conduct, thereby shifting the costs generated by harmful copiers to beneficial 
copiers.  
 A final, and significant, concern about the use of DRM self-help is that it 
can be used to protect content that does not enjoy copyright protection.83  For 
example, DRM can be applied to works whose copyright terms have expired and 
should be freely available in the public domain. DRM might also be 
inappropriately applied to content that fails to meet the requirements of 
copyrightability, including nonoriginal data.84  The balance copyright law creates 
between creator incentives and public uses is threatened if content providers 
respond to the risk of unauthorized copying by protecting these works with DRM. 
 It is difficult to judge the net welfare effects of DRM self-help.  In its 
favor are low cost and ease of use, but set against these are the significant chilling 
effects that DRM has on valuable behaviors.  DRM prevents many important uses 
of expressive works, and the penalties attached to DRM circumvention likely 
diminish behaviors that are at the core of human well-being.  Given the risks of 
DRM, it is appropriate to consider other methods for deterring harmful 
unauthorized copying. 
294, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[i]f Congress had meant the fair use defense to apply to such actions, 
it would have said so.").  
82 James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
882, 887-906 (2007). 
83 See Burk, supra note 69, at 1102 (“Indeed, content owners may prefer to rely on 
anticircumvention laws to prohibit tampering with the technological controls, leaving the 
technology to prohibit whichever uses the content owner unilaterally chooses, rather than relying 
on copyright law to prohibit certain statutorily determined uses of the work.”). 
84 Id. 
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 2.  Civil Sanctions and Deterrence 
 
 The standard economic response to costly self-help is the provision of 
civil sanctions with penalties sufficient to deter harmful behavior.85  According to 
economic theory, people will be deterred from engaging in harmful activities if 
the law establishes penalties that equal or exceed the magnitude of the benefits 
violators can hope to achieve from their conduct.  Copyright law does precisely 
this.  Infringement of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights subjects the violator to 
civil liability that is intended to deter such violations.  For a number of reasons, 
however, the effectiveness of civil remedies in certain situations is doubtful.   
 
  a.  Comparing Benefits and Harms 
 
 Economic theory predicts that the law can deter undesirable conduct, 
including copyright infringement, by creating penalties that exceed the benefits 
that can be obtained from engaging in the conduct. For example, if someone is 
contemplating either purchasing or illegally downloading for free $100 worth of 
music, the existence of a fine of $100 or more for the illegal behavior will result 
in her choosing to purchase the music rather than violate the law.  The benefits of 
violating the law to the would-be infringer are smaller than the costs of doing so, 
and a rational person would be deterred from downloading the music. 
 Typically, economic analysis assumes that the magnitude of the penalty 
sufficient to achieve deterrence is marginally higher than the value of the harm 
done to the victim.  Thus, if the penalty for stealing a $10,000 car is $10,001, 
rational people will prefer to purchase the car rather than steal it.  The benefits to 
the violator are generally considered to be equivalent to the harms of the victim 
(plus any additional social harm).  In the context of copyright infringement, 
however, this may not be the case.  First, as mentioned above, much copyright 
infringement is the result of people who value the work at a price between the 
marginal cost of producing it and the monopoly price charged by the copyright 
owner.  If, for example, someone illegally downloads ten albums that cost $10 
each, but if she only values those albums at $5 each, setting the penalty for 
infringement at $100 will lead to overdeterrence of behavior that is not costly.   
More difficult still is the situation involving the large category of 
copyright infringement that is mostly divorced from economic considerations.  
Much large-scale copyright infringement on the internet does not appear to be 
motivated by a desire to obtain works for free.86  Many hackers and members of 
85 See Part I.A supra. 
86 See Goldman, supra note 57. 
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“warez” communities derive benefits from copyright infringement from the 
reputational effects of successfully circumventing DRM and providing copies of 
works for free on the internet.87  Comparing the magnitude of the benefits these 
hackers experience with the harms to copyright owners is extremely difficult.  On 
one hand, the market-based values that hackers experience are likely much 
smaller than the net value of the infringements that result from the hackers’ 
conduct.  On the other hand, the emotional and reputational benefits that they 
experience may be very great indeed and thus difficult to deter.88  Accordingly, 
setting the appropriate magnitude of civil sanctions necessary for deterrence of 
copyright violation will be challenging. 
 
 b.  Detection, Punitive Damages, and Judgment Proof Infringers 
 
By far the most problematic issue with the use of civil remedies to deter 
copyright infringement involves the difficulty of detecting infringing behavior.  
As we described in Part I, setting the magnitude of the penalty equal to a potential 
lawbreaker’s benefits will only achieve deterrence when the probability of a 
violation being detected is one hundred percent.  If the penalty equals the 
lawbreaker’s benefits and if detection is imperfect, the expected benefits of 
violating the law will exceed the expected harms.  In order to solve this problem, 
economic theory suggests that the law rely on punitive (or augmented89) damages 
to create a damages multiplier that will account for imperfect detection.90   
Copyright law, with the availability of statutory damages,91 provides something 
87 Id. at 370 (defining a “warez trader” as “an individual who copies and distributes computer 
software simply for self-aggrandizement—the reputation, the thrill, the ‘fun’ of having the latest 
programs or the biggest ‘library’ of ‘warez’ title.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
88 Lydia Pallas Loren, Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolution of Criminal 
Copyright Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 
835, 855 (1999) (noting, “the damage done by non-commercially motivated infringers can equal 
and sometimes surpass the damage done by infringers engaged in reproduction and distribution for 
financial gain”); Wechsler, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 15 (“…selected cases of 
criminal enforcement have shown that infringers – such as the world’s most resilient bittorrent 
site, Pirate Bay – with a policy agenda beyond economic costs and benefits might still not be 
deterred”). 
89 Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 
LA. L. REV. 3, 7 (1990). 
90 A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 869, 874 (1998) (“punitive damages should be awarded if, and only if, an injurer has a 
chance of escaping liability for the harm he causes”) 
91 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).  A successful plaintiff in a civil copyright suit can recover actual damages 
or statutory damages up to $30,000 for any one work.   
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similar to this, but for a number of reasons it is unlikely to create sufficient 
deterrence.92 
Deterring copyright infringement is different in the digital age.93  When 
making an unauthorized copy of a work required expensive professional 
machinery to print books or copy film strips, detecting infringement was 
relatively easy.94  Now, millions of people own devices that can instantly create 
and distribute infringing copies around the world.  Successfully policing all of 
these people is impossible, and the likelihood that any individual infringement 
will be detected is infinitesimal. 95  Even large scale infringements of multiple 
works are unlikely to be detected at levels significantly above zero.  In addition, 
even if copyright owners are able to detect the existence of an infringement, 
connecting it to a specific person will be incredibly difficult.  Potential infringers 
are spread out around the world and hidden behind IP addresses that mask their 
identities. 
From the perspective of economic analysis, the damages multiplier that 
would be necessary to raise expected penalties from infringement above expected 
benefits will be very large.  If only one-tenth of one percent of copyright 
infringements are detected (probably a generous figure),96 the damages multiplier 
is 1000.  This means that if an infringer causes $200 worth of harm, she will be 
responsible for $200,000 in damages.   
Copyright infringement damages of this magnitude create will tend not to 
have the appropriate effect on marginal deterrence, because many defendants will 
be judgment proof for these amounts.  In the past, significant resources were 
92 A successful plaintiff in a civil copyright suit can recover actual damages or statutory damages 
up to $30,000 for any one work. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).  In addition, if the violation was willful, the 
plaintiff can receive an additional $750 to $150,000 per work.  17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
93 Wechsler, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 10 (“It is, in particular, IP crimes in a 
digital environment where infringers are intentionally evasive that are most difficult to detect – a 
problem that is corroborated by the increasing sophistication of organized crime.”). 
94 We should note that there are some copyrightable works the infringement of which may not be 
very difficult to detect.  Infringement of architectural works will likely be relatively easy to detect.  
Infringement of sculptural works may currently be easy to detect, but the rise of 3D printing may 
make it easier to copy and share sculptural works online.  Michael Weinberg, It Will Be Awesome 
if They Don't Screw it Up: 3D Printing, Intellectual Property, and the Fight Over the Next Great 
Disruptive Technology, Public Knowledge (Nov. 10, 2010), http:// www.publicknowledge.org/it-
will-be-awesome-if-they-dont-screw-it-up. 
95 Hardy, Criminal Copyright, supra note 46, at 313 (“In many cases of copyright infringement 
today, the chance that an infringer will be caught is substantially less than fifty percent.  For many 
individuals using the Internet, for example, the chance of being caught for occasionally 
downloading a copyrighted song, or uploading a copyrighted piece of software, is almost zero.”). 
96 Tom Tyler lists the objective probabilities of being caught, convicted, and imprisoned for 
burglary and larceny at one percent.  Tom R. Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: 
A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 219, 222 (1996). 
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necessary to engage in large scale copyright infringement.97  The commercial 
enterprises that were capable of producing many copies of bootlegged recordings 
or unauthorized books would generally have been able to pay significant 
infringement damages.  Now, when an eighteen-year-old college student can 
infringe thousands, or even hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of copyrights, 
the likelihood that defendants will have the resources necessary to compensate 
plaintiffs is low.98  Since the magnitude of copyright liability will often exceed 
infringers’ ability to pay,99 impecunious infringers will not be subject to 
significant deterrence. If a potential infringer is unable to pay $2,000,000 worth of 
damages, there is nothing deterring him from causing $3,000,000 worth of harm.   
Thus, for certain classes of copyright infringers—private actors with 
limited resources engaged in large scale infringement—the threat of civil 
sanctions may be insufficient to establish deterrence.  These actors will tend not to 
have the capital available to meet the kinds of high magnitude damage awards 
that low levels of detection necessitate.   
 
3.  Secondary Liability 
 
 Although individual infringers may not have the resources necessary to 
satisfy large civil damages awards, many of them use intermediaries to distribute 
unauthorized copies of works.  By suing these intermediaries, including file-
sharing websites and internet service providers (ISPs), can copyright holders 
efficiently deter infringement?100  In theory, subjecting intermediaries to 
97 ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG TO GATES 
(2009). 
98 Manta, Puzzle, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 503 (“Copyright infringers also 
often do not have ‘deep pockets,’ so it is difficult for owners to recover much in civil litigation 
compared to the amounts spent on attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs.”). 
99 Consider the sanctions in the Tenenbaum and Thomas-Rasset cases mentioned supra notes 
Error! Bookmark not defined.-Error! Bookmark not defined..  Damages awards in the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars might well have exceeded the defendants’ resources. 
100 See Lital Helman, Pull Too Hard and the Rope May Break: On the Secondary Liability of 
Technology Providers for Copyright Infringement, 6 (2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1539627.  Helman writes: 
Secondary liability of technology providers is designed as a vehicle to promote effective 
and efficient copyright enforcement, through three main objectives. First, to provide a 
cost-effective litigation mechanism, compared with the alternative path of suing countless 
direct infringers.  Second, to generate adequate compensation to plaintiffs through the 
‘deep pockets’ of technology companies. Third, to position technologies as gatekeepers 
who can hinder infringement, by designing technologies in a copyright-friendly fashion, 
as well as utilize their service fees to both distribute revenues to copyright owners and 
discourage infringement. 
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secondary liability can lower the costs of detecting and suing individual 
infringers.  It also attaches liability to parties that are less likely to be judgment 
proof and creates incentives for intermediaries to monitor the behavior of users.101  
Copyright law’s secondary liability doctrines of contributory infringement and 
vicarious liability enable such lawsuits, but, as with all such strategies, we must 
determine whether they generate more benefits than costs.102  We suspect that 
enhanced use of secondary liability will not deter enough harmful behavior to 
offset its potential effects on legitimate behavior. 
 First, although file-sharing websites like Napster and Grokster and content 
hosting platforms like YouTube have been largely responsible for the expansion 
in unauthorized copying in the digital age,103 much copyright infringement still 
occurs without intermediaries.  Parties who produce bootlegged copies of CDs 
and DVDs to sell on street corners and over the internet typically do not rely on 
intermediaries to distribute content.  When they do, the intermediary’s 
relationship to the infringing behavior will often be too insignificant to trigger 
secondary liability.104  In these circumstances, secondary liability simply does not 
reach the infringing content. 
 Second, many intermediaries would suffer from the deterrence problems 
that arise for individual infringers, i.e., that they are undercapitalized relative to 
the magnitudes of judgments and that they are often run by groups with political 
rather than economic motivations that make them hard to deter.105  The cost of the 
infrastructure necessary to run a file-sharing website consisting of servers and 
other hardware, while not inconsiderable, is still relatively small compared to the 
size of a judgment that could be levied against it.  The value of the infringing 
content shared on a website like BitTorrent, even ignoring the availability of 
statutory damages, likely dwarfs that of the resources used to make it available.  
 Finally, secondary liability doctrines, which make intermediaries 
responsible for the behavior of their users, could chill valuable speech.  Although 
much of the behavior taking place on BitTorrent websites involves socially 
harmful unauthorized copying, there is considerable activity on websites like 
YouTube that is socially beneficial.  To the extent that intermediaries are subject 
101 Id. 
102 See Douglas Lichtman & William Landes, Indirect Liability for Copyright Infringement: An 
Economic Perspective, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 395 (2003). 
103 See Helman, supra note 100. 
104 Contributory infringement requires that the defendant “knowingly” induces, causes, or 
otherwise materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another. Gershwin Publishing Corp. 
v. Columbia Artists Management, 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).  Vicarious liability requires 
that the defendant have a direct financial stake in the infringing behavior.  Shapiro, Bernstein & 
Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963). 
105 See Goldman, supra note 57. 
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to liability for copyright violations of their users, they are likely to be risk averse 
in the face of threatened lawsuits and thus readily limit access for users who are 
engaging in valuable speech at the boundary of infringement.106  For example, 
although the DMCA creates “safe harbor” provisions that shield intermediaries 
who respond to copyright takedown notices sent by content owners, those 
intermediaries have very little interest in carefully screening contested claims of 
unauthorized use.107  It is easier and less risky for them to simply remove the 
contested content.  Accordingly, we fear that expanded use of secondary liability 
might be more costly in terms of overall social welfare.   
 
C.  The Theoretical Case for Criminal Copyright Sanctions 
 
 Deterring socially harmful copyright infringement with DRM and civil 
sanctions may be difficult and costly in some settings.  Creating deterrence for 
judgment-proof infringers using civil sanctions alone may be impossible.  In 
response, copyright owners can turn to technological measures to prevent 
infringement in the first place. But as we have shown, reliance on self-help can 
itself create social costs.  DRM will tend to protect uncopyrightable content, and 
it will prevent fair and valuable uses of copyrightable material.  Accordingly, it is 
worth considering the possible value of criminal sanctions, including 
imprisonment, as a deterrent to harmful copyright infringement.  In this section, 
we propose a limited scope for the efficient use of criminal sanctions in copyright 
law.  In addition, we discuss some possible caveats to our proposal, and we 
address some arguments in favor of criminal copyright liability that we believe 
are incorrect. 
 
 1.  The Benefits of Criminal Sanctions 
 
 As we explained in Part I, economic analysis recognizes certain cases 
when criminal penalties can be more efficient than other mechanisms for 
deterring harmful conduct.  Criminal penalties are valuable when self-help is 
costly and when civil remedies are insufficient to deter behavior.  These two 
factors are likely true for some kinds of copyright infringement.  Yet the existence 
of some deterrence benefits does not necessarily mean that criminal sanctions are 
efficient.  They should only be adopted if the deterrence benefits exceed the costs 
of their use. 
 When a rock star infringes the copyright of another singer’s song, criminal 
sanctions will not be necessary.  The likelihood that the infringement will be 
106 See Neal Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1007-08 (2001). 
107 Id. 
29 
 
                                                 
detected is high, and the rock star will probably be able to pay the resulting 
damages award.  This is not the case, however, for a private person who uploads 
hundreds of copyrighted files onto the internet.  Detection of these behaviors is 
low, so the magnitude of the damages award necessary to create deterrence will 
almost certainly swamp the person’s assets.  A potential infringer may not be 
dissuaded at all by the threat of a judgment so large that it can never be paid.108  
And high-magnitude damages awards eliminate the possibility of marginal 
deterrence—once the damages award exceeds the infringer’s present and future 
resources, there is nothing stopping her from infringing further.   
 Because monetary damages are unlikely to deter individual large scale 
infringers, criminal sanctions may be appropriate.  The threat of imprisonment or 
some type of alternative sanction may create the necessary deterrence against 
socially harmful copyright violations.109  The alternative sanctions that we have in 
mind are those that have often been used in cybercrime prosecutions—
prohibitions on the ownership or use of technologies that are capable of violating 
copyrights.110  This means that for some period of time, people convicted of 
criminal copyright infringement would be subject to prohibitions or limitations on 
their use of computers, cell phones, tablets, and other electronic devices.111  For 
deterrence purposes, alternative sanctions will be cheaper to enforce than 
incarceration, and they may have an important deterrent bite between potentially 
underdeterring civil sanctions and potentially overdeterring incarceration.  
Perhaps more important than their deterrent effect, however, is the incapacitative 
effect of alternative sanctions.  If enforced, these sanctions should prohibit 
108 Some copyright infringement judgments may be dischargeable in bankruptcy if the 
infringements were not “willful and malicious.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).  The Ninth Circuit has 
recently indicated that the “willful and malicious” inquiry in bankruptcy law is not equivalent to 
the “willfulness” inquiry in copyright law, and that the former must be established separately by a 
bankruptcy court.  In re Barboza, 545 F.3d 702, 707 (2009) (requiring separate analysis of whether 
copyright infringement was willful and malicious as those terms are understood in bankruptcy law 
for determining whether discharge is suitable). 
109 Hardy, Criminal Copyright, supra note 46, at 314. 
110 See Dept. of Justice, Prosecuting Computer Crimes, 146 available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf (“Where a networked computer 
has been used to perpetrate online fraud, to receive contraband such as child pornography or stolen 
credit card numbers, or as the instrument of intrusions into or attacks on other computers, these 
considerations may militate in favor of imposing a restriction on computer use as a condition of 
supervised release.”). 
111 See e.g. U.S. v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 878-79 (7th Cir. 2003) (overturning a one-year ban on the 
use of the internet by a convicted child pornographer but allowing more narrowly tailored 
restrictions on internet use, including random searches and filtering software).  See generally 
Robin Miller, Validity of Condition on Probation, Supervised Release, or Parole Restricting 
Computer Use or Internet Access, 4 A.L.R. 6th 1 (2005). 
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offenders from engaging in future copyright infringements.  Incapacitation will be 
particularly valuable from an economic perspective for those defendants, like 
warez traders and the ringleaders of file sharing sites, who are difficult to deter 
because of their political beliefs.  If they are causing harm and other penalties do 
not deter them, incapacitation through imprisonment or alternative sanctions can 
prevent the harmful behavior. 
 The recently implemented Copyright Alert System may go a significant 
way towards creating the kinds of deterrence and incapacitation that alternative 
criminal sanctions would.112  The system, which was implemented in February 
2013 by the Center for Copyright Information, tracks the online behavior of users 
of BitTorrent websites. Users who are detected engaging in illegal file sharing 
will receive multiple notifications of their detection and warnings against 
continued file sharing.  After the fifth or sixth such alert, users may be subject to 
severe temporary limitations on their internet bandwidth that would prevent more 
file sharing.  Although the Copyright Alert System has received criticism from 
some academics and the Electronic Frontier Foundation,113 its use may be less 
controversial and more efficient than the alternative of highly punitive civil or 
criminal sanctions. 
 Before discussing the costs of criminal copyright liability, we should 
address one argument in favor of criminal liability that we do not find persuasive 
in this context.  As noted in Part I, public detection and prosecution of harmful 
conduct can be more efficient than private enforcement because economies of 
scale favor a single police force and because private individuals may struggle to 
enforce laws on their own.  If two people are both robbed, it is inefficient for both 
of them to investigate the crime when the police could combine the investigations.  
Owners of copyrights, however, are well organized and represented by major 
industry associations that can devote the necessary resources to detecting and 
litigating infringements.  So although a single infringer may be violating 
copyrights of many different owners, the RIAA and MPAA appear willing and 
able to police this conduct.  In fact, much of the criminal investigation performed 
112 Bridy, Annemarie (2012). "Graduated Response American Style: "Six Strikes" Measured 
Against Five Norms". Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal 23: 1–
66.  
113 Id.; Mary LaFrance, Graduated Response by Industry Compact: Piercing the Black Box, 30 
Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 165 (2012); Abigail Phillips, The Content Industries and ISPs Announce 
a “Common Framework for Copyright Alerts”: What Does It Mean for Users?, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (July 7, 2012), available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/07/content-industry-
and-isps-announce-common. 
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by the Justice Department occurs following notification of infringing behavior by 
these associations.114 
 
 2.  The Costs of Criminal Sanctions 
 
 Although imposing criminal penalties for copyright infringement may 
have some deterrent benefits, it is not without costs.  The most obvious costs of 
criminal copyright infringement are the costs of detection, enforcement, 
prosecution, and sanction.  The costs of detecting and prosecuting copyright 
infringement are typically shared by the public (via the Department of Justice) 
and organizations that represent the victims (the RIAA, MPAA, and software 
organizations and companies).  These costs are often steep.  In addition, 
imprisoning offenders creates significant costs: prisons are expensive to operate, 
inmates are no longer productive members of society, and imprisonment creates a 
variety of additional harms to offenders and society.115  The social harms caused 
by unauthorized copying would have to be extremely large in order to justify the 
significant costs of detecting, prosecuting, and imprisoning copyright infringers. 
Accordingly, if the technological prohibitions mentioned above have significant 
deterrent effect, they will be much less costly to administer. 
 Infringement liability is intended to deter people from engaging in socially 
harmful unauthorized copying, but because copying can also serve socially 
valuable purposes, enhanced penalties risk chilling some beneficial conduct.116  
Some people may refrain from valuable but legally questionable conduct if the 
penalties for infringement increase.117  The likelihood of this happening will 
depend on the similarity between acceptable and unacceptable conduct and the 
difficulty of predicting ex ante whether certain behaviors are legal or not.118 
 As we describe above, one of the principal benefits of civil or criminal 
sanctions to deter copyright infringement is the reduction in socially wasteful self-
help.  If criminal sanctions lead to improved deterrence of copyright infringement, 
copyright holders would no longer need to rely on DRM to prevent infringement.  
The reduction in overbroad DRM usage that eliminates (or at least makes more 
costly) much socially valuable conduct is the chief goal of enhanced deterrence.  
Whether content owners would refrain from using DRM is, however, unclear.  
114 Kim F. Natividad, Stepping It UP and Taking It to the Streets: Changing Civil and Criminal 
Copyright Enforcement Tactics, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 480-2 (2008). 
115 Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, Happiness and Punishment, supra note 24. 
116 See Moohr, Overcrimininalization, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 26 
(“…criminal enforcement, to the extent it deters infringing activity, may also deter socially 
valuable conduct that is not unlawful.”). 
117 Manta, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 499. 
118 See Moohr, Overcrimininalization, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 26-27. 
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The creation and use of DRM code is relatively cheap for content owners, and this 
is especially true because the DMCA minimizes the costs of an arms race with 
hackers.  Moreover, DRM generates significant benefits for copyright holders in 
addition to preventing illegal copying.  DRM enables copyright holders to protect 
works beyond their copyright term and to protect content that is not an 
appropriate subject for copyright law.  DRM also can significantly increase the 
costs of fair use.  As we described, circumventing DRM for fair uses may not be 
exempted from the DMCA, and even if it is, the uncertainty of whether conduct is 
in fact fair use will deter many risk-averse users. This may be entirely consistent 
with the preferences of copyright holders:  much fair use, especially criticism and 
parody, will be objectionable to copyright owners.  Since the reduction in DRM 
usage is the main benefit we anticipate from criminal liability, it is important to 
know whether it would actually occur. 
 One solution to this problem is for Congress to disallow DRM entirely.  
Since DRM can be socially harmful, and since the justification for the costs of 
criminal sanctions is the reduction of DRM usage, Congress could simply prevent 
the distribution of copyright works in media that include technological protection 
measures. 
 A final category of costs worth mentioning includes the possible effects of 
imposing criminal liability on conduct that many people believe does not warrant 
it.  There is considerable variation in people’s beliefs about the harms of 
copyright infringement.119  Many people believe that downloading music and 
movies from the internet is not harmful at all and certainly should not subject 
offenders to imprisonment.120  Stark divergence between social norms about 
behavior and legal rules governing it can be very costly.121  When norms and law 
diverge, people’s respect for the law decreases, and their compliance rate 
declines.122 Thus, if people believe that criminal sanctions are inappropriate for 
copyright infringement, the benefits of deterrence will be weaker.123  As with 
119 Hardy, Criminal Copyright, supra note 46, at 326 (“We are witnessing, then, a growing split 
between the government and various copyright-dependent industries, like music, computer 
software, and motion pictures, 
on the one hand, and highly critical copyright consumers and Internet users on the other.”). 
120 Id. at 314 (“…the trend toward greater deterrence through greater punishment of infringement, 
especially criminal punishment, seems increasingly at odds with the public’s perception of what is 
fair and what is consistent with the American tradition of individual liberty.”). 
121 See Tyler, supra note 96, at 219. 
122 Moohr, Overcriminalization, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 29 (“Respect and 
legitimacy are threatened when a community norm that condemns prohibited conduct is not yet in 
place.”). 
123 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 64 (1990); Moohr, Overcriminalization, 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 16 (“Under any theory of deterrence, it is more 
difficult to induce law-abiding behavior when underlying social norms do not support the law.”).  
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DRM, however, the precise effect of criminal copyright liability on norms is 
difficult to predict. It is also possible that the imposition and effective 
enforcement of criminal sanctions for violating copyright law could help people 
understand the harm of copyright infringement, resulting in greater convergence 
between social attitudes and the law. 
 Subject to these important qualifications, there is a sound, if limited, 
economic case for the use of criminal penalties to deter some copyright 
infringement.  Civil sanctions alone appear ineffective at deterring some socially 
harmful copying. In response, copyright owners will increasingly turn to DRM to 
combat this behavior.  But while DRM can be used to prevent socially harmful 
copying, it will also tend to limit socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works.  If 
criminal sanctions can deter harmful conduct that would not have been deterred 
by civil sanctions alone, copyright owners should be willing (or compelled) to 
forego DRM, thereby decreasing the costs of valuable behavior.  The chief 
economic rationale for criminal copyright law is not that it will allow copyright 
holders to capture more rents, but rather the expectation that deterring some 
harmful copying will generate more beneficial behavior. 
 
D.   What Kind of Criminal Liability Could be Desirable? 
 
 Part II.C made the theoretical case for using criminal sanctions to deter 
copyright infringement.  We believe that some kind of criminal copyright liability 
may be economically justified. In this section, we describe the nature of the 
criminal sanctions that are mostly likely to be beneficial. The use of criminal 
sanctions to deter copyright infringement offers significant benefits but also 
considerable costs.  As with most such projects, accurately estimating the costs 
and benefits is difficult.  This is especially true given the empirical uncertainty 
surrounding some of the most important issues.  In the face of this uncertainty, the 
use of criminal sanctions for copyright violation should be narrowly 
circumscribed and limited to situations that are likely to produce the highest 
benefits at the lowest costs. 
 Criminal liability is especially important with respect to individual or 
poorly capitalized infringers of large quantities of copyrighted material who are 
difficult to detect and identify.  Accordingly, criminal liability should focus on 
these situations.  It would certainly be objectionable to disproportionately 
prosecute and imprison poor offenders.  Yet focusing prosecutorial effort on those 
acts of infringement which are the most costly and most difficult to detect makes 
economic sense.  Additionally, infringement prosecutions should address large 
scale counterfeiting operations that market bootlegged music, movies, and 
software. These behaviors likely cause the most social harm, and these are the 
violators for whom criminal liability will pack the most deterrent punch.  
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 Imposing criminal liability risks chilling valuable conduct, so criminal 
sanctions should be reserved for behavior that is most clearly harmful.  This is the 
case for exact duplication of copyrighted works that will directly substitute for 
legitimately available copies.  Although copyright law gives authors the exclusive 
right to make derivative works and substantially similar copies of their works, a 
great deal of behavior that falls into these categories also could constitute fair 
use.124  By contrast, there will be an extremely limited number of situations when 
exact duplication of copyrighted works can constitute fair use.  By confining 
criminal liability to the latter cases, the risks of chilling socially valuable behavior 
can be minimized. 
 These risks can be further minimized by including a strict mens rea 
requirement for criminal liability.  Mens rea standards can be helpful in 
distinguishing harmful from valuable conduct.  Accordingly, criminal copyright 
infringement should condition liability on proof that the defendant intentionally 
violated a known copyright.  That is, the prosecution should have to prove that the 
defendant knew that the infringed works were protected by copyright and that he 
knew that his conduct was unlawful.  Good faith belief that his behavior was not 
copyright infringement or constituted fair use should preclude criminal liability.   
Finally, in order to further guard against deterring socially valuable 
behavior, the DMCA should be amended to clearly exempt defendants from 
liability when their circumvention of technological protective measures is done 
for purposes of fair use or to obtain access to content that is not protected by 
copyright.125  In theory, perfect enforcement of copyright law would eliminate the 
need for technological protections, but perfect enforcement is not possible in 
practice and, given the cost of achieving it, is not warranted.  Thus, the use of 
DRM can help prevent harmful copyright violations, but users who circumvent it 
for valuable reasons should not be subject to liability. 
 
E.  Assessing Current U.S. Criminal Copyright Law 
  
Having made the limited and tentative economic case for criminal 
sanctions for some copyright infringement, it remains to assess the extent to 
which current U.S. law conforms to our judgments.  For the most part, it matches 
124 Moohr, Overcriminalization, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 27 (“Most 
copyrighted works are based, directly or indirectly, on the work of others.  Potential creators may 
be reluctant to use copyrighted work, which is a sort of ‘raw material’ for new work, when the 
potential cost of doing so is very high.”). 
125 See Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 
159 (2004) (“The legal status of fair use and the scope of the fair use defense might be clarified for 
the digital age if Congress amends the DMCA so that copyright holders are not permitted to deny 
access to fair users.”). 
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our prescriptions fairly well.  The provisions of criminal copyright law and the 
enforcement efforts of the Department of Justice generally comport with our 
analysis of when such liability is appropriate.  We do have some concerns about 
the monetary thresholds for criminal liability, however.   
  
 1.  Current Criminal Copyright Law 
 
  U.S. copyright law provides for the use of criminal sanctions to deter 
copyright infringement in 17 U.S.C. § 506.  The law provides for punishment of 
any person “who willfully infringes a copyright…if the infringement was 
committed (A) for purposed of commercial advantage or private financial gain; 
[or] (B) by the reproduction or distribution, including by electronic means, during 
any 180-day period, of one or more copies or phonorecords of one or more 
copyrighted works, which have a total retail value of more than $1,000.”126  Thus, 
to be found liable, a defendant must be shown to have acted willfully and to have 
been motivated by commercial advantage or to have met the damages threshold 
established in the second provision of the statute.   
The mens rea requirement of willfulness is helpful in limiting the potential 
for chilling valuable copying behavior.  Courts have generally interpreted this 
requirement to require proof of a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal 
duty.127  This typically means that the defendant subjectively knew that the 
infringed works were subject to copyright and that his conduct was unlawful.  
Merely intending to copy is insufficient.  Given this fairly strict requirement, it is 
unlikely that the existence of criminal sanctions will deter fair use. 
 We are less confident that the thresholds for criminal liability in 
subsections (A) and (B) are sufficient to limit criminal liability to those cases 
when it is most effective.  The requirement in (A) that the defendant be motivated 
by commercial gain or profit covers much conduct where civil liability would be 
sufficient.  Selling a copy of a CD to a friend for $10 would meet the requirement, 
but there is no reason to think that the apparatus of the criminal law is necessary 
to deter this behavior.  Even with the low likelihood of detection, the harm it 
causes is slight.   
Subsection (B)’s requirement, which was added by the No Electronic 
Theft (NET) Act of 1997, removes the necessity of proving the defendant’s 
motive, but it does add a monetary threshold.  It is difficult to predict whether 
$1000 is the appropriate place to set this limit.  The answer will turn on the 
probability of detection and the availability of a damages multiplier in civil suits.  
126 17 U.S.C. § 506. 
127 Rebecca E. Hatch, Criminal Infringement of Copyright Under 17 U.S.C.A. § 506, 120 AM. JUR. 
PROOF OF FACTS 3D 181, §3 (2011). 
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If a defendant willfully infringes $1,000 worth of copyrighted works, he may be 
liable for statutory damages of up to $30,000 per infringed work and up to 
$150,000 in enhanced damages for willfulness.128  If the total civil damages 
award for the $1,000 infringement is $200,000, then a rational person will only be 
deterred from infringing if the probability of detection is at least 0.005 (one-half 
of one percent).  If the damages multipliers cannot be constitutionally raised to 
reflect likelihoods of detection that are lower than this, the $1,000 threshold may 
be set close to the optimal value.  In addition, defendants who cannot pay such 
large judgments also might not be deterred by civil fines, in which case criminal 
penalties could be necessary. 
The penalties for criminal copyright infringement are specified in 18 
U.S.C. § 2319.  Defendants found guilty under 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A) (the 
commercial gain or profit subsection) are subject to imprisonment for not more 
than five years if they reproduce or distribute at least ten copies of one or more 
works with a total retail value of more than $2,500 in any 180-day period.129  The 
maximum prison term doubles upon subsequent convictions.130  For defendants 
found guilty under subsection (B) (the monetary threshold section), the maximum 
prison term is three years for a first offense and six years for subsequent 
offenses.131 
In addition, some courts have been willing to employ computer use 
restrictions and other alternative sanctions as conditions of probation and 
supervised release.  One defendant was subjected to three years of probation 
during which he “shall maintain a daily log of all addresses he accesses via any 
personal computer or other computer used by him, other than for authorized 
employment, and he shall make this log available to the Probation Officer.”  
Additionally, “the defendant shall refrain from accessing, via a computer, any 
‘material’ that relates to the activity in which he was engaged while committing 
the instant offense, namely, [Internet Relay Chat] channels; e-mail and instant 
messaging that relate to warez activities; and any internet warez related web sites, 
channels, and private sites.”132  Although monitoring these sanctions may be 
difficult, that is always the case with probation and supervised released.  If they 
are backed with the threat of a return to prison, they may nonetheless be 
successful even if they are not perfectly enforced. 
128 17 U.S.C. § 504. 
129 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1). 
130 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(2). 
131 18 U.S.C. § 2319(c)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 2319(c)(2). 
132 See U.S. v. Fong, 2006 WL 5388953 (N.D. Cal Nov. 2, 2006).  See also U.S. v. Bailey, 286 
Fed. Appx. 678,  679 (11th Cir. 2008) (where the defendant’s supervised release was revoked for 
failure to adhere to computer restrictions). 
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As always, it is difficult to say whether the penalties imposed for 
copyright infringement are well-balanced to maximize their deterrent benefit and 
minimize social costs.  Sending people to prison is very expensive. Moreover, as 
we have argued elsewhere, longer terms of imprisonment may have diminished 
deterrent capacity relative to their length and cost.133  Given the high social cost 
of imprisonment, terms exceeding a few years are probably not efficiently 
deterring copyright infringement.  The use of alternative sanctions such as 
technological use limitations is worth exploring.134  The threat of having limited 
internet and cell phone access for five years may be sufficient to deter many 
twenty-year-olds from engaging in large scale copyright infringement.  And the 
costs of imposing such sanctions are relatively low: only monitoring costs and the 
productivity losses from limiting offenders’ use of communications technologies.  
In addition, many copyright violators who are not motivated by economic gain, 
especially those whose behavior is politically motivated, may be difficult or 
impossible to deter with any size sanction.135  Accordingly, alternative sanctions 
that prevent them from engaging in violations in the first place may have valuable 
incapacitative effects.  Without access to technology that enables infringement, 
these offenders will be less likely to cause harm.  Although alternative sanctions 
impinge upon offenders’ free speech rights, they are almost certainly less extreme 
than the liberty losses associated with imprisonment.136 
 
2.  Criminal IP Enforcement 
 
Although the scope and magnitude of criminal penalties for copyright 
infringement may be overbroad, the behavior of prosecutors and judges seems 
generally consistent with efficient deterrence.  The Department of Justice tends to 
prosecute between 50 and 100 cases each year,137 and the defendants are typically 
those engaged in the kinds of conduct that is most appropriate for criminal 
liability—large-scale counterfeiting that is difficult to detect. Most recently, for 
example, the leaders of the internet piracy group “IMAGiNE” were convicted of 
running “an organized online piracy ring that sought to become the premier group 
133 Bronsteen, Buccafusco & Masur, Happiness and Punishment, supra note 24. 
134 See Sam Cowin, You Don’t Have Mail: The Permissiblity of Internet-Use Bans in Child 
Pornography Cases and the Need for Uniformity across the Circuits, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 885 
(2012). 
135 See Goldman, supra note 57. 
136 U.S. v. Holm, 326 F.3d at 878 (noting that “such a ban renders modern life—in which, for 
example, the government strongly encourages taxpayers to file their returns electronically, where 
more and more commerce is conducted on-line, and where vast amounts of government 
information are communicated via website—exceptionally difficult). 
137 Hatch, supra note 127, at § 1. 
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to first release Internet copies of movies only showing in theaters.”138 The 
defendants received sentences ranging from 23 to 60 months.139  In another recent 
case, the defendant was convicting of producing and selling thousands of 
counterfeit music CDs and movie DVDs at flea markets in California. The 
estimated retail value of the counterfeit goods was $2.6 million.  The lead 
defendant in the case received a four-year sentence.140  
These are the kinds of defendants against whom criminal liability will be 
most valuable.141  Their behavior is hard to detect and occurs on a large scale.  If 
they were subject only to civil liability, the magnitude of the damages awards 
would almost certainly exceed their ability to pay.  Moreover, their behavior—
counterfeiting music, movies, and software—is the kind that creates substantial 
social harm and little, if any, social benefit.  The fact that someone was convicted 
138 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Leader of Internet Piracy Group “IMAGiNE” Sentenced in Virginia to 
60 Months in Prison for Criminal Copyright Conspiracy (2013), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/January/13-crm-010.html. 
139 Id.   
140 U.S. Dept. of Justice, San Jose Man Sentenced To Prison For Extensive Conspiracy To Sell 
Counterfeit Media (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/cae/news/docs/2012/11-
2012/11-19-12colorado.html. 
141 See also Department of Justice, Annandale Man Sentenced to 36 Months for $2.5 Million in 
Software Piracy (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2012/11/20121108nguyennr.html (The defendant pled 
guilty to copyright infringement for selling $2.5 million in copyright-infringing computer software 
and defrauding more than 2,000 customers.  He was sentenced to 36 months in prison, followed by 
three years of supervised release.  Additionally, he was “ordered to pay restitution of $2.5 million 
and a forfeiture money judgment of $1.4 million.”); Department of Justice, Internet Businessman 
from New York Sentenced for Infringing Copyrights (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/2012/12/20121203newsomenr.html (The defendant pleaded 
guilty to four counts of criminal copyright infringement and was sentenced to eleven months in 
prison followed by three years of supervised release which includes nine months of home 
confinement.  As an additional part of his sentence, the defendant forfeited “assorted computers, 
hard drives, and other electronic equipment.  The defendant owned and operated an online 
business selling copyrighted computer software, education, and training materials worth 
approximately $345,021.68.  A civil copyright infringement suit was previously filed against the 
defendant in 2006.); Department of Justice, Leader of NinjaVido.Net Website Sentenced to 22 
Months in Prison for Criminal Copyright Conspiracy (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/press-releases/2012/besharaSent.pdf (The leader of 
NinjaVideo.net Website was sentenced to twenty-two months in prison followed by two years of 
supervised release following her prison stay, and she must complete 500 hours of community 
service.  In addition, the defendant must “repay $209,826.95 that she personally obtained from her 
work at NinjaVideo.net and forfeit to the United States several financial accounts and computer 
equipment involved in the crimes.  The website which operated from February 2008 until June 
2010 enabled visitors to view movies still in the theaters, movies not yet released, as well as newly 
aired television shows.). 
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and sentenced for selling thousands of copies of bootlegged music is unlikely to 
deter others who are engaged in conduct that is socially valuable. 
 
* * * 
 
This Part has analyzed the theoretical economic case for imposing 
criminal sanctions on copyright infringers and found that criminal penalties may 
be warranted to deter some behaviors that might otherwise go unchecked by civil 
sanctions or DRM.  The existence of criminal penalties for copyright infringement 
could minimize copyright owners’ reliance on DRM thereby reducing the costs of 
socially beneficial uses of copyrighted works.  Deterring socially harmful copying 
while promoting socially beneficial copying promotes overall welfare.  As noted, 
however, important questions about the precise effects of criminal liability remain 
unanswered and unanswerable with current data. 
 
III.  CRIMINAL PATENT LAW? 
 
 Although we believe that there is a limited economic case for criminal 
copyright sanctions, this does not automatically mean that the same is true for 
patent law.  The economics of patents and inventions are very different from those 
of copyrights and creative works.  Accordingly, this Part applies the economic 
theory discussed in Part I to the unique issues that arise for patent law. 
 
A. The Economic Harm from Patent Infringement 
 
 In order to determine whether criminal sanctions would be economically 
beneficial in patent law, we must first determine what (if any) economic harm is 
caused when a firm or individual infringes a patent.  There are two possible 
sources of harm.  The first is the reduction in the patent holder’s incentives to 
commercialize, improve, or create the invention in the first place—that is, the 
reduced incentives to innovate in light of the reduced returns to owning a 
patent.142  These costs are extremely difficult to calculate because they require 
answering a hypothetical counterfactual: how much innovative work would the 
patent-holding firm have done had they known that their patent rights would be 
infringed by a competitor?  This in turn implicates the question of how much 
other firms will reduce their innovative efforts in the future if they have reason to 
believe that their future patent rights will not be secure.  As we did with copyright 
142 See supra Part I.B. (describing an economic theory of patent rights as an inducement to 
innovation). 
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law, though, we will treat some forms of patent infringement as causing social 
welfare losses.143 
The second potential source of harm from patent infringement lies with 
the possibility of expensive self-help by the patent holder.  What form might that 
self-help take in the patent context?  The kinds of technological measures that are 
available for copyrighted works will generally not be available to prevent 
unauthorized use of new inventions.    Innovators could, however, switch from 
patents to trade secrets, thereby preventing unauthorized use of the invention by 
refusing to share it publicly.144   Inventors could try to limit others’ ability to 
know essential aspects of an invention, giving them a competitive advantage.  A 
trade secret is the IP equivalent of building high walls around a piece of property.  
(Some trade secrets are in fact protected by high walls.)  Trade secrets are 
privately costly because they require private expenditures to secure them; the 
owner of a trade secret must expend resources protecting that secret via 
technological measures (such as walls, both physical and electronic) and 
nondisclosure agreements.145  They may also be socially costly (compared with 
patents) precisely because information surrounding the technological advance is 
kept secret rather than shared with the public.146  One of the principal benefits of 
the patent system is the anticipated quid pro quo between inventors and the 
public—in return for getting exclusive rights in their inventions, inventors must 
disclose those inventions to the public who benefit from the opportunities for 
further innovation.147 
 We suspect, however, that the risk of firms electing trade secrets over 
patents is relatively small, even in an environment in which patent infringement 
goes under-deterred.  Many inventions will simply be impossible to protect with 
trade secrets.148  When an invention is commercialized and sold, competitors will 
143 As with copyright law, there will be some authorized uses of patents that will not be socially 
costly.  Again, when infringers fall in the category of deadweight losses, their infringement (at 
least without effective price discrimination) does not cause social welfare harms.  Additionally, as 
discussed infra, some forms of patent infringement, such as “inventing around” a patent, may 
create net social benefits (analogously to fair use of copyrighted works). 
144 Anderson, supra note 45, at 923-24 (describing the options available to innovators choosing 
between different forms of intellectual property protection). 
145 Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L. 
REV. 311, 332 (2008) (describing trade secret law and the requirements it places on owners of 
trade secrets).  
146 Id. at 341 (analyzing the social losses that accompany decisions to opt for trade secrets over 
patents). 
147 Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 542 (2009) (describing the benefits 
of patent disclosure and the tradeoffs at the heart of intellectual property). 
148 See Lemley, supra note 145, at 315 (making this point about the difficulty of protecting trade 
secrets for commercial products). 
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be able to reverse-engineer the product and reveal the innovation underlying it.149  
Reverse engineering is not prohibited by trade secret law, so competitors will 
quickly gain access to the underlying invention.150  This will be true for nearly all 
pharmaceuticals and biotechnology (whose chemical formulae are discernible 
from the drugs themselves), medical devices, and machinery, as well as many 
electronics, and semi-conductor inventions.  Inventions of processes that can be 
practiced behind closed doors, the fruits of which can then be sold without 
revealing the secrets, may still be protectable as trade secrets.  (Ironically, 
business methods and software—the most commonly cited examples of bad 
patents—may often fall into this category.151)  And certainly there will be some 
inventions that are too complex or opaque to be successfully reverse-engineered.  
But by and large, the types of innovations that are currently protected by patent 
law will not be protectable by trade secrets. 
 Of course, the harm that patent infringement will do is only part of the 
equation.  Although the existence of meaningful harm is necessary in order 
answer the threshold question of whether sanctions for infringement are 
worthwhile, determining the appropriate level of those sanctions will require 
understanding the value of the infringement to the infringer.  Here, the story is 
somewhat clearer.  The benefit to an infringer from patent infringement is just the 
profit that the infringer received from the infringement, over and above whatever 
profit the infringer might have made had it sold a non-infringing product 
instead.152  This is similar to the inquiry that a court must conduct when 
determining the “reasonable royalty” that an infringer must pay to a patent holder 
that has prevailed in court.153  For the most part, it depends upon the number of 
sales that the infringer has made and the profits per sale.  This inquiry can be 
quite technically difficult, as it often involves answering a complicated counter-
factual.154  But it is at least conceptually straightforward, and a court will often be 
able to compute the measure to within a reasonable approximation. 
 
B. Likelihood of Detection 
 
149 Dunlop Holdings, Ltd. V. Ram Golf Corp., 524 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.) 
(discussing the possibility of reverse-engineering commercial products). 
150 Lemley, supra note 145, at 315 (discussing reverse engineering). 
151 See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 18, at 203 (describing the arguments typically leveled against 
software and business method patents).  
152 LaserDynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51, 54 (2012) (describing the proper 
measure of damages in patent cases). 
153 Id. at 55 (discussing the reasonable royalty measure of damages). 
154 See id. at 57 (illustrating the difficulties inherent to properly calculating a running royalty).  
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 As we noted above, the deterrent power of sanctions and their appropriate 
magnitude will depend on how often harmful behavior will be detected. How 
likely is detection of patent infringement?  Here it is useful to separate two types 
of infringers: those who infringe accidentally and would prefer to negotiate 
licenses, and those who infringe deliberately (and could more accurately be 
characterized as engaging in theft).  Patent owners will always have incentives to 
search for possible infringers.  Unintentional infringers—the first group—would 
have similar incentives to search for patents that their products might infringe, in 
order to secure licenses.155  They would also have no incentives to attempt to hide 
or disguise their products or to obscure the fact that those products are infringing.  
These unintentional infringers are thus quite likely to be detected (at least 
eventually) by patent owners. 
 For intentional infringers who do not wish to be caught, the picture is not 
quite so clear.  These parties will attempt to hide their infringement, and the onus 
will be entirely upon patent holders to locate them.156  This increases the search 
burden placed upon patent holders, but does it mean that these infringers are 
unlikely to be discovered?  We suspect that the answer is generally no.  Most 
infringing products that are placed on the shelves and sold openly are quite likely 
to be detected due to the strong incentives that patent holder have to police their 
property rights.  It is always possible that a domestic black market for innovative 
goods could develop, much like the black market in pirated CDs and DVDs.  (We 
will discuss international markets below.)  But no significant such market appears 
to exist, and we think that is unsurprising for several reasons.  First, the cost of 
producing patented products is typically much higher than the cost of copying 
copyrighted works.157  Any individual with a computer and the right software can 
produce burned DVD copies, but it would take a factory to make the computer 
used to burn the DVD.  The same holds true for semiconductors, biotechnology, 
and the like.  The second, related reason is that quality is much more at issue in 
patented products than it is for copyrighted works.  Partly because it is so easy to 
produce pirated copyright works, and partly because they are so inexpensive, 
purchasers do not typically worry about receiving a copy of unusable quality.  But 
this is not the case for drugs or electronics, for example, where obtaining a low-
quality copy would be expensive and even potentially harmful.  Accordingly, 
155 See Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Liability Rules as Search Rules, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 193 
(2011) (analyzing patentee and infringer search incentives). 
156 Id. at 194 (discussing this case). 
157 See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 367 (2010) (explaining 
the economics of bringing a patented invention from the laboratory to the marketplace). 
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consumers will tend to opt for purchasing patentable goods from trusted sources, 
not on the black market.158 
 The greatest likelihood of infringement going undetected involves patents 
on processes, including software patents, that can be performed behind closed 
doors.  Just as these processes are easiest to conceal, and thus lend themselves 
most directly to the use of trade secrets, so too are they easiest to infringe in secret 
without detection.159  A patent holder could always study the products or services 
being performed by a competitor and deduce that the competitor must be violating 
its patent; or it could take a guess, file an action alleging infringement, and then 
seek discovery that would reveal the competitor firm’s secret activities.  
Accordingly, even secret infringing activity is by no means impossible to detect.  
But there is at least a chance that it could go undetected for a meaningful length of 
time.  The result is symmetry between infringers’ and patent holders’ actions: it is 
easier to infringe a process patent than a product patent without being detected, 
and it is easier to use trade secrets to protect a process than to protect a product, 
making innovators significantly more likely to opt out of the patent system and 
into trade secret protection when their innovations take the form of processes.  
This trend will be heightened when patent holders view infringement remedies as 
inadequate.  The case for criminal penalties for patent violations is thus strongest 
with respect to process patents, particularly patents on inventions that could 
conceivably be practiced in secret. 
 While we believe that infringing activities are generally likely to be 
detected, findings of liability are another matter entirely.  Federal district court 
judges find patent law notoriously difficult,160 and the Federal Circuit has itself 
been widely criticized for issuing confusing decisions, promulgating ambiguous 
doctrines, and simply deciding cases incorrectly.161  One of us has separately 
suggested that courts should award heightened damages to patent owners that 
prevail at trial (and assess penalties against patent owners that fail) in order to 
compensate parties for the risk that their cases will be decided incorrectly.162  The 
risk that an infringer will be discovered but not sanctioned is thus very real. 
158 See id. at 378 (discussing marketplaces for inventive goods).  
159 W. L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (describing the 
use of a patented process in secret, in a fashion that did not inform the public). 
160 David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008) (demonstrating that even 
experienced patent judges have nearly 50% of their claim construction opinions reversed). 
161 Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 478 (2011) (listing the various 
criticisms that have been leveled at the Federal Circuit). 
162 Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 
2013) (suggesting a mechanism for compensating patent holders for the risk of error in the courts). 
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 But the risk may not be all that great.  Even if patent courts are no better 
than a coin flip, there is still a 50% chance that an infringer will be sanctioned.  
That is much better odds than exist for most crimes, where criminals are caught 
and sentenced to prison at a far lower rate.  A 50% rate would require only that 
damages be doubled, which is not insignificant but is again far lower than the 
types of multiples typically contemplated for other crimes, including copyright 
infringement.  But we suspect that patent courts, for all of their flaws, are actually 
better than a coin flip.  This will decrease the necessary multiples accordingly.  If, 
for instance, patent courts are 75% accurate, then the necessary multiple would be 
4/3, a relatively modest figure. 
 Of course, patent law awards heightened damages, but not to compensate 
for the possibility that infringement will go undetected or unpunished.  Rather, 
judges in patent trials can award up to treble damages in cases of “willful” 
infringement: those instances in which a party knowingly and deliberately 
infringed a patent.163  It should be clear from the preceding paragraphs that this 
practice makes little sense from the perspective of optimal deterrence, at least on 
its face.  However, as we will explain below, there is one respect in which 
enhanced damages for willful infringement tracks a rational economic theory of 
sanctions for intellectual property violations. 
 
C. Judgment-Proof Patent Defendants? 
 
 The next issue is whether patent defendants would typically be able to pay 
judgments levied against them if those judgments took the form of monetary 
sanctions, or whether they would in a significant number of cases be insolvent or 
judgment-proof.  In section III.A, we noted that the benefit to an infringer from 
infringing a patent is equal to the infringer’s profits from the sale or use of the 
patented product.  These profits could in theory be quite substantial: if a firm sold 
a patented drug on the black market for a price just below the monopoly price, it 
could earn tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars.  Profits from the 
infringement of less valuable inventions would likely be smaller but could still be 
significant. 
 However, in section III.B we observed that patent infringement will 
generally be easy to detect, with some notable but limited exceptions.  Because 
most infringement will be detected, it will not be necessary to substantially 
increase the sanctions to account for the likelihood of non-detection in order to 
achieve appropriate deterrence.  There may have to be some multiplier to account 
for the fact that “conviction” is never certain in a patent court.  Nonetheless, the 
163 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
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proper measure of sanctions for infringement will typically hover near the 
measure of infringer profits.  With rare exceptions, then, the overall sanction 
should be at or near the level of profits earned by the infringer. 
 We believe that patent infringers will tend not to be judgment-proof and 
will be able to afford this measure of damages.  We reach this conclusion for two 
reasons.  First, as we noted above, manufacturing a patented product for sale is 
often quite expensive.164  A firm that wishes to sell computers, or smartphones, or 
any other type of consumer electronics will require a factory of some sort to 
assemble those computers, and even a pharmaceutical infringer will need a 
significant operation to produce prescription drugs in any quantity.  To be sure, 
some inventions, such as software, can be duplicated with a minimum of capital 
investment.165  But the median patented product will require a far greater 
investment of resources to produce in quantity than will the median copyrighted 
DVD or CD.  Accordingly, patent infringers will generally be larger, better-
capitalized operations with substantial resources that can be seized in order to pay 
judgments.  Against such firms, monetary damages will create adequate 
deterrence. 
Of course, there is always the possibility that an infringer will be a foreign 
firm whose assets cannot be seized by American courts.  To the extent that black 
markets for patented products have developed, they have typically been foreign-
based, for precisely this reason.166 But if American courts cannot reach a firm’s 
assets, they will not be able to reach the persons running those firms for purposes 
of criminal penalties either.  Thus, while deterrence may be an issue with regard 
to infringers operating abroad, imposing criminal penalties in cases of patent 
infringement will not ameliorate the problem. 
 The second and even more general reason that patent infringers will not be 
judgment-proof is that they will have the profits they have earned from the 
infringement available to them.  Simple disgorgement of these profits should be 
nearly adequate to deter firms from infringing a patent.  Recall that this is not the 
case in many instances of standard property crimes.  In a typical property crime, 
the property may be damaged or spoiled before it is recovered, or it may never be 
recovered at all.167  In addition, because property criminals are caught and 
prosecuted at low rates, it is necessary to multiply the punishment imposed upon 
164 See supra Part III.B. 
165 See supra Part II. 
166 See Planet Money, Black Market Pharmacies and the Spam Empire Behind Them, Jan. 15, 
2013, available at http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2013/01/15/169424047/episode-430-black-
market-pharmacies-and-the-spam-empire-behind-them (describing the internet black market for 
patented drugs and how it operates abroad). 
167 See supra Part I.C (describing the effects of property crimes on property). 
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them many times in order to achieve adequate deterrence.168  This means that 
forcing the wrongdoer to disgorge the stolen property, by itself, cannot serve as an 
adequate sanction.  It is of course possible that patent infringers might “spoil” the 
profits they have stolen by absconding with them or investing them in an asset 
that has lost value.  But this is much less of an issue with respect to monetary 
profits that will often be recoverable as cash than it is with respect to stolen 
property that might have been fenced, destroyed, or otherwise reduced in value.  
By consequence, we believe it is quite likely that patent infringers will be able to 
pay the monetary judgments against them, even when those judgments are large 
enough to induce deterrence. 
 
D. Optimal Activity Levels and Incapacitation 
 
  Before we can reach any final conclusions regarding the propriety of 
criminal sanctions for patent infringement, there are two other questions we must 
consider.  The first is the optimal level of patent infringement: should there be 
zero infringement, or more than zero?  Of course, in a utopian world there would 
in fact be zero patent infringement, but the question is whether the level of 
precaution necessary to bring that about would be more or less socially costly 
than the harm of infringement itself.  Put another way, the question is: how close 
is patent infringement to socially valuable conduct?  Returning to the explanation 
we offered in Part I, it would be extremely costly if every person were to drive his 
or her car so carefully that no automobile accidents ever occurred.  Because 
driving is (typically) a socially valuable activity that should be allowed to take 
place, society tolerates some number of accidents in order to enable individuals to 
drive without having to bear the costs of excessively costly precautions.  On the 
other hand, intentional murder bears no resemblance to any socially useful 
activity, and thus there is no precaution too costly.  The optimal rate of murder is 
zero, even accounting for the costs of precautions, and that is why the penalty for 
murder is infinite or close to infinite—the death penalty or life in prison—in 
many jurisdictions. 
 It should be clear from this brief exposition that the socially optimal level 
of patent infringement is well above zero.  Engaging in innovative research and 
development is immensely valuable, and it would be tremendously costly for 
inventors to take the precautions necessary to ensure that they are never violating 
an existing patent.169  Merely searching through the existing stores of patents is an 
168 See id. 
169 See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 37-43 (2006) 
(describing cases of simultaneous invention and the difficulties that even honest firms have in 
avoiding accidental patent infringement). 
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immensely costly endeavor; determining what technologies those patents actually 
cover is even costlier.170  Demanding that a firm never infringe a patent would 
almost certainly mean asking that firm to cease operations entirely.171 
 The case for tolerating some instances of patent infringement may be even 
stronger than it is for automobile accidents.  Conduct that presses against the line 
between permissible and impermissible may be socially productive in the patent 
context, where it is generally not in others.  Consider efforts to “engineer around” 
a patent.  When a firm understands the boundaries of a patent and tries to evade 
that patent by developing a process or product that does not infringe it, sometimes 
it is merely trying to deny another patent holder its due rewards.  But much of the 
time the research and development that go into engineering around a patent are 
highly socially valuable and result in a superior alternative to the patented 
invention.172  In the course of engineering around, a firm might discover a 
cheaper or more efficient way to produce a good or process, or it might hit upon 
an improvement to the invention that carries additional benefits.  This is activity 
that society should encourage, not ban.  More generally, much of patent 
infringement is inadvertent and occurs in the course of otherwise productive 
activity.  It would be inappropriate to increase the penalties for infringement to a 
level at which they would discourage these types of innovative activities.  Unlike 
crimes like murder, there is generally no case for assessing penalties for 
infringement beyond the minimum needed to ensure deterrence. 
 It might appear to some observers that willful infringement describes a 
category of cases for which the optimal activity level is conceivably zero.  
Perhaps, they might argue, there is no reason infringers who know that they are 
using another party’s intellectual property should be allowed to do so without 
licensing it.173  The patent owners are being deprived of the just rewards for their 
inventions, and the infringers are not engaging in any useful research and 
development of their own.  Damages for such an activity should be set at an 
extremely high level, or perhaps criminal penalties should even be imposed.  
According to this line of argument, patent law is right to impose heightened 
damages in precisely these cases. 
 Yet we do not believe the story is so simple.  First, many cases of willful 
infringement start out as non-willful infringement and only transform into willful 
170 See Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 687, 
715 (2011) (describing the costs created by the “patent thicket” as firms search for patents they 
might be infringing). 
171 See Manta, supra note 10, at 498-99. 
172 See Masur & Malani, supra note 162, at 34 (describing the virtues of engineering around as a 
socially beneficial activity). 
173 See In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(describing willfully infringing conduct and explaining the arguments against tolerating it). 
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infringement when the patent owner notifies the infringer of the existence of the 
patent.174  In these “mixed” cases only the part of the infringement that occurred 
after the infringer gained notice of the infringement should count as willful, and 
often this is the minority of the activity.  Second, in many cases an infringer will 
have attempted to obtain a license from the patent owner but failed.  Bargaining 
breakdowns in bilateral monopoly situations are common and well-understood.  
The patent owner may also be making unreasonable demands or be in a position 
to hold up the infringer for significant rents.  Under these circumstances, one 
cannot say that the optimal level of infringement is zero: the concessions by an 
infringer necessary to negotiate a license in every case may well be more socially 
costly than the infringement itself, particularly when the patent owner has the 
right to seek an injunction to halt the infringing conduct entirely.175  That is, it 
may be more socially costly for the infringer to either cease activity entirely or 
pay the patent holder’s ransom than it is for the infringement to have taken place. 
 That is not to say that patent holders should not be compensated for willful 
(or any other type of) infringement.  A thief is not entitled to steal a car just 
because the owner of the car refuses to sell it for the thief’s price.  But it is to say 
that even willful infringement can occur under circumstances in which it could be 
very costly to prevent.  Accordingly, the case for even greater damages—beyond 
what is necessary for standard deterrence—is weak even with respect to willful 
infringement. 
 The final question is whether individuals who infringe patents should be 
incapacitated—that is, whether they should be actively prevented from 
committing further acts of infringement, rather than deterred.176  This question 
relates to the preceding discussion because it raises the issue of whether 
infringement can ever resemble a socially productive activity, or whether it is 
purely harmful.  If we believe that infringers merely create social costs, and we 
believe that an individual who has infringed once is likely to do so again, then 
174 See Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 
(detailing the practice of patentees using letters to inform potential infringers that they might be 
infringing and thereby create the knowledge necessary to trigger liability for willful infringement). 
175 35 U.S.C. § 283. 
176 This raises interesting questions regarding how the government would go about incapacitating 
a corporation, if that is the entity that is found to infringe.  We thank Mark Lemley for raising this 
point.  The corporation itself could be liquidated, though that seems highly overbroad.  More 
likely, we imagine that the corporate employees involved in the infringement—the scientists who 
developed the innovation, and the executives or general counsel who authorized the 
infringement— could be imprisoned, or even prevented from working in an innovation-related 
field after being released.  This penalty would mirror the criminal sanctions in securities fraud 
cases.  There, guilty parties are often prohibited from working in the financial industry. 
 This penalty may strike the reader as excessive.  It certainly strikes us that way, and in 
the discussion that follows we will reject it.  
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there is an argument for using incapacitation.  Better directly to block the person 
from engaging in future acts of infringement than to rely upon deterrence—which 
failed once—to accomplish the same task. 
 As the foregoing paragraphs should make clear, we do not believe that this 
is an accurate depiction of infringing activities.  Individuals who infringe once are 
not necessarily likely to do so again.  The infringement might have been based 
upon a mistake or a lack of information.177  Or it might have been the result of 
innovative activity, activity that generally should not be quashed.  The individuals 
involved in the infringement might also be especially talented, innovative, or 
productive members of society, the types of individuals whom it would be most 
costly to incarcerate.  At some level this is an empirical question about which we 
can only offer an educated guess—it might be that there are serial patent 
infringers who seem to have no regard for others’ intellectual property rights.  But 
we suspect that infringement is typically a byproduct of normal innovative and 
commercial activities, and if this is the case then incarceration would be too heavy 
a cudgel to employ. 
 Moreover, even if we are entirely wrong about this analysis, there are less 
costly ways to prevent an individual from infringing in the future than 
incarcerating that person.  Depending on the individual’s prior activities, she 
could be barred from serving as an officer or director of a corporation, or even 
prevented from working in a particular technological field.  This is analogous to 
the sanction of taking away an individual’s computer that we discussed in Part II.  
Such a measure would no doubt be costly, but not nearly so costly as actually 
locking the individual behind bars.  It should serve only as an absolute last step—
but that means that prison need not be any type of step at all. 
 
* * * 
 
Because the benefit to a patent infringer is capped at the measure of 
profits, because patent infringement is likely to be detected, and because the vast 
majority of infringers will be capitalized firms that have access to the profits they 
have just reaped from the infringement, the case for criminal sanctions for patent 
infringement is especially weak.  Arguments regarding activity levels or the need 
for incapacitation have no greater purchase.  Accordingly, we believe it is 
appropriate from an economic perspective that American law imposes no criminal 
penalties for any acts related to patent infringement.178  The only area in which 
we feel that criminal penalties might conceivably be desirable involves secret 
infringement of patented processes.  Even here, where detection is much less 
177 See supra notes 170-174and accompanying text. 
178 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (Patent Act as amended). 
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certain, criminal penalties should be used extremely sparingly, if at all.  The 
economic structure of patents, and the economic realities of innovation and 
commercialization, provide superior alternatives. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Scholars and stakeholders have been wrong to assume that criminal 
sanctions for IP infringement are justified on economic grounds.  It is true that 
criminal sanctions could play an important role in preventing harmful behavior 
that cannot be deterred through other means.  But imposing criminal sanctions is 
costly.  For patent infringement, the costs of imposing criminal sanctions are very 
unlikely to exceed its benefits.  Civil sanctions will probably be sufficient for 
creating the optimal amount of infringing behavior.  For copyright infringement, 
civil sanctions alone should be sufficient to deter nearly all types of harmful 
conduct.  There is an economic case for imposing criminal sanctions for copyright 
infringement only with respect to a discrete set of activities: massive reproduction 
and sales of commercially valuable works.  We have arrived at the conclusion that 
the case for criminal IP sanctions is weak or non-existent while putting to one side 
both non-economic considerations, such as moral or deontological objections to 
criminal IP sanctions, and economic concerns about the efficacy of IP in 
promoting innovation.  Once those considerations are added to the calculus, we 
suspect that the argument for criminal sanctions for IP infringement will 
disintegrate almost entirely. 
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